Seclusive Cache Hierarchy for Mitigating Cross-Core Cache and Coherence Directory Attacks

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Abstract—Cross-core cache attacks glean sensitive data by exploiting the fundamental interference at the shared resources like the last-level cache (LLC) and coherence directories. Complete non-interference will make cross-core cache attacks unsuccessful. To this end, we propose a seclusive cache hierarchy with zero storage overhead and a marginal increase in on-chip traffic, that provides non-interference by employing cache-privatization on demand. Upon a cross-core eviction by an attacker core at the LLC, the block is back-filled into the private cache of the victim core. Our back-fill strategy mitigates cross-core conflict based LLC and coherence directory-backed attacks. We show the efficacy of the seclusive cache hierarchy by comparing it with existing cache hierarchies.

I. INTRODUCTION

Multi-level cache hierarchies are indispensable for high-performance computer architectures. They alleviate long latency main-memory requests by storing frequently used data near the processor. However, from the perspective of security, caches have become an active attack surface to extract critical information, including private keys, keyboard strokes, and websites visited. This attack is made possible by observing the time difference between a hit and a miss, which is often related to an application’s data access pattern.

The advent of practical and robust cache attacks [1], [2] has created an essential need for the research community to look for active defenses. The primary focus is on Last-Level Caches (LLCs), as most practical attacks target LLCs shared between different cores [3]. These LLC attacks fall into two categories: (i) Conflict-based attacks [4], where the attacker tries to learn the victim’s access pattern by carefully orchestrating their data-accesses and observing conflicts, and (ii) Flush-based attacks [5], where the attacker tries to attack memory locations shared with the victim.

Flush-based attacks are the easiest to mount since it relies on shared data. The attacker uses clflush [5] instruction to evict a set of data blocks from the cache and observe the victim’s accesses to those blocks. Although very practical, with broad applications in many prominent attacks such as Spectre [1], flush-based attacks have severe limitations as it depends on the clflush instruction. Many cloud platforms turn off clflush support, thus disabling this attack altogether [6]. On the other hand, conflict-based attacks are an important class of attacks that rely on the fundamental interference property of caches (i.e.) caches have a finite capacity and different addresses conflict for the same cache set. This property makes conflict-based attacks harder to mitigate, and we focus on defense for this class of attacks in our work.

In many commodity processors, multi-level cache hierarchies are often inclusive, i.e., all lower levels of the cache hierarchy are a super-set of its higher levels. This inclusive property is maintained by the back-invalidation operation, which ensures that a data-eviction from a lower-level cache (shared LLC) mandates an eviction of that data from all higher-level private caches. Thus, an attacker can efficiently orchestrate conflicts in the shared LLC, invalidating the sensitive data from all private caches and use that to extract sensitive information from the victim. A natural solution is to use non-inclusive caches that do not let shared cache accesses affect private cache states. However, recent research suggests that the cache coherence directories that hold information of all these non-inclusive private caches are inclusive, making directories the new attack surface [6]. Besides, it is also possible to attack high-speed interconnects in non-inclusive caches using Invalidate+Transfer [7]. Thus, conflict-based cache attacks are here to stay, requiring a fundamental solution to mitigate them.

Existing efforts that try to seal these timing attacks in the LLC largely fall into three categories viz. cache partitioning [8]–[13], cache randomization [9], [14]–[16] and secure policies for caches [17], [18]. However, existing efforts are limited and are often impractical to implement (high performance overhead, dependency on Instruction Set Architecture (ISA), runtime system, or Operating System (OS)). In this work, we propose a fundamental change to cache hierarchies that seal conflict-based cache and coherence directory attacks with minimal overheads.

We propose seclusive caches, a secure cache hierarchy, that breaks the fundamental LLC interference between the attacker and the victim by privatizing the victim cache line upon an eviction. We make an important observation that practical conflict-based attacks are made possible due to cross-core evictions, where the attacker and the victim reside on different cores. The critical approach in our proposed hierarchy consists of a back-fill strategy, where any cross-core eviction of a cache line detected at LLC is filled back to the private L2 cache of the victim core. This simple back-fill breaks the interference between the attacker and the victim, rendering conflict-based, coherence directory-based, and interconnect-based attacks invalid.

Prior solutions propose strict constraints on the cache hard-
ware (e.g. partitioning) to break the existing side-channel, whereas we provide privatization on-demand. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that proposes an effective solution towards securing multiple attack surfaces like LLC, coherence directory, and interconnect. We experimentally show that a seclusive cache hierarchy seals conflict based LLC side-channel attacks and evaluate our proposal using Champsim [19], a micro-architectural simulator, to experimentally show the performance trade-offs over the existing multi-level cache hierarchies.

In summary, our key contributions are as follows:

- We propose seclusive caches, a secure multi-level cache hierarchy that prevents cross-core conflict-based LLC and coherence directory attacks. (Section III)
- We show the efficacy of our proposed seclusive cache hierarchy by comparing its performance and security trade-offs with the currently existing multi-level cache hierarchies and other secure cache hierarchy proposals in the literature. (Section IV)

II. BACKGROUND

A. Multi-level Cache Hierarchies

Due to the ever-growing memory wall, multi-level cache hierarchies were implemented to reduce the latency gap. However, these hierarchies open up a novel design space in which they can be designed in many different ways depending on where and how data flows between these caches. Some of the existing hierarchies that dictate the flow are as follows:

Inclusive cache hierarchy. As the name suggests, in inclusive cache hierarchy all the lower levels of the memory (L2, LLC, etc.) are a super-set of their higher levels. A miss in a higher level of the cache hierarchy permeates to its lower levels sequentially, until the block is found at any of the lower-levels of the cache hierarchy. In case it misses in all the levels, it is fetched from the main-memory and filled to all the cache levels to maintain inclusivity. In addition, this inclusive property mandates that whenever a block is evicted from any cache, the same block is evicted from all the higher levels of the cache-hierarchy, termed as back-invalidation. Inclusive caches are widely used because maintaining cache coherence is simple. However, the inclusive nature of the shared caches makes it a target for information leakage through side-channels.

Exclusive cache hierarchy. In this hierarchy, unlike the inclusive counterpart, the lower levels of caches are not a super-set of their higher levels i.e. each cache level has a unique set of data, and hence, exclusive cache hierarchy has higher effective cache capacity. Upon a miss from all the cache levels in an exclusive hierarchy, the block is fetched and populated only to the private caches present in the highest-level. The cache block marches down the hierarchy (L2 & LLC) as and when it is evicted from an upper-level cache.

Non-Inclusive cache hierarchy. It is a hybrid of both inclusive and exclusive cache hierarchies (neither inclusive nor exclusive). In this hierarchy, whenever there is a cache miss from all the cache levels, the fetched block is populated to all the levels (similar to inclusive cache hierarchies). However, whenever there is an eviction in the lower-level cache, the higher levels are not back-invalidated (similar to exclusive cache hierarchies). Hence, non-inclusive caches preserve the best of both inclusive and exclusive cache hierarchies.

B. Cache Timing Attacks

Typically, in a cross-core timing channel attack, the attacker exploits shared structures like LLC, cache coherence directory, and shared interconnect to leak information. These attacks can be broadly classified into two buckets:

Conflict based attacks. One of the popular conflict based attacks is PRIME+PROBE [4]. It works by forming an eviction set, where the attacker finds W cache lines that fills a W-way cache set. Upon victim’s access to that set, one of the attacker’s W cache lines is replaced. By measuring the access time for reaccessing these W cache lines, the attacker gets information about the victim’s accesses. These victim accesses are often a function of the data (e.g., accessing indexes based on a secret key in cryptographic algorithms), and hence these access informations can be used to steal critical data.

Flush based attacks. These attacks work by sharing some part of memory space with the victim process (e.g., shared library such as glibc). The attacker flushes a shared block (often using clflush), and then waits for victim access. Then the attacker reloads the flushed block, and the access latency of that load reveals whether the victim has accessed that block or not. An example of such an attack is Flush+Reload [5].

Cross-core timing channel attacks at the LLC are more powerful than intra-core attacks at the private cache because LLC is shared between all the cores. Cross-core cache attacks are possible only at the LLC. For intra-core attacks, private caches are used because they are less susceptible to noise and give better accuracy. But, in a server environment, it is easier to get the attacker and victim process to share an LLC than a private cache. This paper focuses on preventing cross-core attacks because they require the least assumptions.

C. Coherence Directory and Interconnect based Attack

A non-inclusive cache hierarchy makes cross-core LLC based attacks difficult as there is no back-invalidation to private caches. For invalidating the blocks from private caches, the attacker exploits the cache coherence directory [6] because of its inclusive property. For a directory structure such as the one present in Skylake-X server [6], there is a traditional directory that tracks the cache lines present in the LLC and an extended directory that tracks the cache lines present in the private caches.

This directory is inclusive in nature because it has to track all the blocks present in different levels of cache. The attacker creates contention in the extended directory (PRIME phase), which evicts the victim’s block from its private L2 cache to the LLC. If the victim re-accesses that block, then it causes another contention in the extended directory, evicting one of the attacker’s block to the LLC, which can be detected by the attacker during its PROBE phase, thereby leaking information. Thus, directories are the new inclusive attack surface in non-inclusive cache hierarchies.
Another cross-core attack [7] that works with non-inclusive cache hierarchy use high speed interconnect like AMD’s Hyper-Transport [20], Intel QuickPath [3] to leak secret information. The attack exploits the timing difference between accessing a block from a remote core’s private cache and DRAM. The attacker invalidates the blocks from the victim’s cache. Whenever the victim accesses that block, it gets filled in the victim’s private cache. When attacker accesses that block again, it gets less latency as compared to bringing that block from DRAM due to high speed interconnect.

III. SECLUSIVE CACHE HIERARCHY: DESIGN PRINCIPLES

The goal of a secure cache-hierarchy is to fundamentally seal side-channels using a lightweight solution (in terms of cost and area) with minimal performance degradation. The impending challenges in achieving this goal are threefold: (i) the design complexity of the solution, (ii) performance vs. security tradeoff, and (iii) implications to cache coherence and directory-based attacks. In this section, we discuss our proposal called the seclusive cache hierarchy in detail and explain how it overcomes the aforementioned design challenges.

A. Working of Seclusive caches

Consider a three-level cache hierarchy with a multi-core system, having a shared LLC and private L1 and L2 caches. Let’s assume there is a load request from a core for a cache block, which is not present in the entire cache hierarchy i.e. an LLC miss. The block is fetched from the DRAM and is filled into the LLC and requesting core’s private caches. If the target LLC set is full, an existing block in the set has to be evicted based on the cache replacement policy. Two types of evictions are possible in this scenario: (i). The evicting and the evicted cache blocks are from the same core, and (ii). The evicting and the evicted cache blocks are from different cores (cross-core eviction). In seclusive caches, the same core evictions are handled similar to a non-inclusive LLC. However, on a cross-core eviction, the evicted block is back-filled to the private cache (L2) of the core of evicted block. This back-fill strategy privatizes the cache block and breaks the existing side channel. The cache coherence directory and additionally the presence of owner-bits in some implementation, can be used to detect cross-core evictions and the core to back-fill.

In case the evicted block is dirty, the dirty block is made clean by writing into the DRAM and subsequently the cleaned block is then back-filled to L2, with its dirty bit reset. In case the evicted block is shared between multiple cores, for instance with multi-threaded applications, the block gets back-filled to one of the sharers. If other threads require that block, then it can easily be serviced by a high speed interconnect. If it is not needed by any thread, then it can be safely evicted by that core, incurring minimum overhead.

B. Effect of Seclusive cache hierarchy on Cross-Core Conflict based Cache Attacks

In an inclusive cache hierarchy, with a PRIME+PROBE attack, the attacker evicts victim’s block at LLC by filling that cache set with its own data (PRIME phase). When the victim’s block is evicted from the LLC, it is also evicted from its private caches due to back-invalidation. When the victim accesses that block again, it evicts an attacker’s block at LLC, thereby leaking information to the attacker, during its PROBE phase.

Figure 1 shows the effect of cross-core conflict based attack with seclusive cache hierarchy. (1) The attacker evicts victim’s block from the LLC. Since, this is a cross-core eviction (2), the block is back-filled to victim’s cache. When the victim accesses the block (3), it gets a hit in its private L2, and does not accesses the LLC. When the attacker re-accesses its block, it gets hits all the time (4), giving an impression to the attacker that victim has never accessed its block. The attack is thus mitigated because the attacker does not get the true latency information of whether the victim has accessed its block or not since there is no observable interference at the LLC.

C. Effect of Seclusive cache hierarchy on coherence directory and Interconnect based attacks

In non-inclusive LLCs there is no back-invalidation operation, making conflict based cache attacks harder to mount. However, as discussed in section II-C the inclusive coherence directory becomes the new attack surface.

In a seclusive cache hierarchy, whenever the attacker tries to evict the victim’s block using cross-core eviction in the extended directory, it back-fills the block to the victim’s private cache, and we track that block in the traditional directory. When the victim re-accesses that block, it gets hit in its private L2,
which breaks the reverse interference, which was the cause for the eviction of attacker’s block. This breaks the side channel, as now attacker’s accesses always result in a hit irrespective of the victim’s accesses.

Interconnect based attacks work by evicting the victim’s block from private caches and then measuring timing difference between remote core access and DRAM access, as mentioned in section II-C. In a seclusive cache hierarchy, when the attacker evicts victim’s block using cross-core eviction, it back-fills the block to victim’s private cache. Now, irrespective of the victim’s accesses, the attacker always gets an access latency similar to the latency of remote core’s access latency, breaking the side channel.

IV. Evaluation

Design Methodology: We evaluate seclusive cache hierarchy\(^1\) on a cycle-accurate, trace-based micro-architectural simulator, ChampSim [19], that models an out of order processor with multi-level caches and DRAM. It has been recently used for evaluating LLC replacement policies at Cache Replacement Championship (CRC-2) [21], ISCA’17, data prefetchers at Third Data Prefetching Championship (DPC-3) [22], ISCA’19 and instruction prefetchers at First Instruction Prefetching Championship (IPC-1) [23], ISCA’20. The parameters for the simulated system are given in Table I. We model different L2-LLC cache sizes based on different Intel micro-architectures in Table II. 32KB of L1I and 48KB of L1D is constant in all three systems.

A. Security Analysis

We analyse the security of different cache hierarchies with cross-core eviction based cache attacks, PRIME + PROBE attack, which has minimum assumptions, is chosen for our analysis. We run GnuPG 1.4.13 [26] as our victim application which uses a private key to decrypt a message. In ChampSim, we pin the victim application to one core. Victim accesses the secret key dependent critical LLC sets containing square and multiply functions used in decrypting the message. The attacker is running on another core, implementing the PRIME+PROBE attack on these critical LLC sets to recover the victim’s private key.

\(^1\)For the benefit of the community, we will share the source code of seclusive cache hierarchy.

![Figure 2](image-url). Probability distribution of attacker probe time (in cycles) in accessing the eviction set.

B. Performance Analysis

The effect on performance with the use of seclusive cache hierarchy is compared with inclusive and non-inclusive cache hierarchies for 2, 4, and 8 core systems. Workloads used for simulation are SPEC CPU 2017 benchmarks [22], [27] and multi-threaded Client/Server traces from IPC-1 [23]. The traces are divided into LLC fitting and LLC thrashing applications, according to LLC Misses per Kilo Instructions (MPKI). Benchmarks having LLC MPKI greater than five are considered as thrashing applications and benchmark having LLC MPKI less than one are considered as fitting applications.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Processor</th>
<th>2/4/8 cores, 4 GHz, out of order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L1I, L1D</td>
<td>48 KB (12 way), 32 KB (16 way), LRU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cache line size</td>
<td>64 B in L1, L2 and L3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRAM controller</td>
<td>1/2/4 controllers for 2/4/8-cores, 64 read/write queues, FR-FCFS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRAM</td>
<td>3200 MHz (11-11-11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| TABLE II CSE HIERRARCHY CONFIGURATION |
|-------------------------------|---|---|
| Micro-Architecture | L2 Size | LLC Size |
| Intel Ice-Lake [24] | 512 KB (8 way) | 2 MB (16 way) |
| Intel Broadwell-EP [25] | 256 KB (8 way) | 2.5 MB (20 way) |
| Intel Cascade Lake-SP [25] | 1024 KB (16 way) | 1.375 MB (11 way) |

| TABLE III REPRESENTATIVE WORKLOAD MIX TYPES. |
| Mixes | Description |
| Mix 1 | Same fitting benchmark on all cores |
| Mix 2 - Mix 4 | Different fitting benchmark on all cores |
| Mix 5 - Mix 10 | Mix of different fitting and thrashing benchmark |
| Mix 12 | Same fitting benchmark on all cores |
| Mix 13 - Mix 14 | Different fitting benchmark on all cores |

Table II shows the probability distribution of attacker probe time in accessing the eviction set.
Evaluation is done on mixing these different benchmarks for different core counts. 14 mixes are generated with different properties. Table III describes the representative mixes used for evaluating performance of different cache hierarchies. Weighted speedup [28] is used as a metric for evaluating performance in multi-core simulations. 

\[
\text{WeightedSpeedup} = \frac{\sum_{i=0}^{N-1} \frac{IPC_{\text{together}}}{IPC_{\text{alone}}}}{N}
\]

where \(IPC_{\text{together}}\) is the IPC of core \(i\) when it is running with other N-1 application. \(IPC_{\text{alone}}\) is the IPC of core \(i\) when it is running alone in an N core system.

Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the performance (in terms of weighted speedup) of non-inclusive and seclusive normalized to inclusive cache hierarchy for SPEC and multi-threaded server traces. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show that for seclusive cache hierarchy, there is no performance degradation as compared to the non-inclusive cache hierarchy. Due to space limitations, we are not showing the performance of seclusive directories, but it performs similarly to the seclusive cache hierarchy.

C. On-Chip Traffic Analysis

Modern processors have a banked LLC to improve bandwidth. Each bank is associated with a core, and all are connected to high speed interconnect. For an 8 core system, the LLC is 8 way banked and connected to an interconnect running at 4 GHz with a data bus of 256 bits. The bandwidth between LLC and interconnect comes out to be 1 TB/s (256 bits per cycle×cycles per second×LLC bank count). Similarly, for 2 core and 4 core systems, the bandwidth is 256 GB/s and 512 GB/s, respectively.

Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the additional bandwidth required by seclusive cache hierarchy normalized to an inclusive cache hierarchy for SPEC and multi-threaded server traces. For an 8 core system, the effective bandwidth required with seclusive cache hierarchy is less than 5% for most of the cases. In general, a thrashing application demands more bandwidth as compared to a fitting application.
D. Storage Overhead Analysis

Seclusive cache hierarchy has zero hardware storage overhead as it utilizes the coherence directory already present in modern multi-core systems. These directories store the information about which core is the owner of each cache block. During a cross-core eviction at the LLC, the back-fill mechanism uses this information to fill the victim cache block back to the owner core’s private cache.

E. Comparison with Relaxed Inclusion Cache

Relaxed Inclusion Cache (RIC) [18] was proposed as a secure cache hierarchy against LLC side-channel attacks, but it does not mitigate cross-core coherence directory and interconnect attacks. It works by relaxing the inclusive property of cache-hierarchy to prevent back-invalidation of private caches. It requires OS support to identify read-only and thread private pages and requires a bit per cache block to track these relaxed blocks, which increase the overhead tremendously for large LLCs. It also requires flushing of cache blocks when a thread is migrated or a page is swapped out, incurring a delay in the critical path. Our proposal does not require any additional storage or support from OS, runtime system, ISA, or compiler.

The high-performance numbers reported in RIC are because RIC has used a small LLC (2MB) for large core count (8 cores), whereas the industry standard is 2MB/per core. The performance of RIC is below the non-inclusive cache hierarchy, and it decreases more when we increase LLC size with respect to the L2 cache size. This observation is also made in one of the recent works [29]. In comparison, the seclusive cache hierarchy performs on the same scale and sometimes better than non-inclusive cache hierarchy, and does not degrade performance with different L2:LLC caches.

Table IV summarizes whether cross-core eviction based LLC and coherence directory attacks are possible with different cache hierarchies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cache Hierarchy</th>
<th>Eviction based LLC Attacks</th>
<th>Coherence Directory and Interconnect Attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive</td>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>Possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Inclusive</td>
<td>Not Possible</td>
<td>Possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relaxed Inclusion</td>
<td>Not Possible</td>
<td>Not Possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seclusive</td>
<td>Not Possible</td>
<td>Not Possible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table IV summarizes whether cross-core eviction based LLC and coherence directory attacks are possible with different cache hierarchies.

V. RELATED WORK

Solutions like Cache Partitioning [8]–[13] separate the victim’s cache partition from the attacker’s cache partition by either partitioning the way, line, or set, or locking the line with a protected bit. This enables non-interference between the two processes and breaks the side-channel. However, the effective cache capacity is reduced, and it may even degrade the performance. In contrast, seclusive cache hierarchy break the side-channel without reducing the effective cache-capacity or impacting performance.

Randomization based solutions [9], [14]–[16] achieve non-interference by randomizing the address space by either having permutation tables or fetching/evicting random lines or by encrypting the address and changing the key periodically. However, having permutation tables are not practical in a large LLC cache, and the encrypted caches protect from only conflict based attacks and not other attacks like coherence directory or interconnect based attacks. In contrast, we propose a very practical solution that provides protection in different attack vectors like LLC, coherence directory, and interconnect.

Secure hierarchy aware replacement policy (SHARP) [17] is a proposal for mitigating cache-based attacks. It does so by changing the replacement policy to give priority to intra-core eviction and then if no choice is left, it goes for random cross-core eviction. The SHARP policy has a lot of loopholes and is not secure, as discussed in recent work [30].

VI. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we introduced the Seclusive cache hierarchy, a low overhead solution for mitigating cross-core last-level cache and coherence directory-based attacks. The performance is at par with non-inclusive cache hierarchy. The security guarantees are stronger than both inclusive and non-inclusive cache hierarchy as it prevents not only cross-core LLC attacks but also coherence directory, and interconnect-based attacks.

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