PERCEPTION
-
fletcherWatson-collis-09_change-blindness-development-attention-in-vision.pdf
@article{fletcherWatson-collis-09_change-blindness-development-attention-in-vision,
title = {The development of change blindness: children's
attentional priorities whilst viewing naturalistic scenes},
author = {Fletcher-Watson, S. and Collis, JM and Findlay, JM and
Leekam, SR},
journal = {Developmental Science},
volume = {12},
number = {3},
pages = {438--445},
year = {2009},
publisher = {John Wiley \& Sons},
annote = {
gives flicker-based change-blindness tests to children and adults, to test
The development of resistance to change-blindness in simple (semantically
meaningful change) situations. - AM
ABSTRACT: Change blindness describes the surprising
difficulty of detecting large changes in visual scenes when changes occur
during a visual disruption. In order to study the developmental course of
this phenomenon, a modified version of the flicker paradigm, based on
Rensink, O’Regan & Clark (1997), was given to three groups of children aged
6–12 years and to a group of adults. This paradigm tested the ability to
detect single colour, presence/absence and location changes of both high and
low semantic importance in a complex scene. Semantically important changes
were detected more quickly and accurately than less semantically important
changes, by all age groups, indicating that children had the same
attentional priorities as adults. Older children achieved more efficient and
accurate detection of changes than younger children and reached almost adult
level at 10–12 years old. These improvements parallel age-related
developments in attention and visual perception. } }
-
herwig-beisert-10_working-memory-and-attention-saccadic-evidence
@article{herwig-beisert-10_working-memory-and-attention-saccadic-evidence,
title={On the spatial interaction of visual working memory and attention: Evidence for a global effect from memory-guided saccades},
author={Herwig, A. and Beisert, M. and Schneider, W.X.},
journal={Journal of Vision},
volume={10},
number={5},
year={2010},
publisher={Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology},
abstract = {
Recent work indicates that covert visual attention and eye movements on the
one hand, and covert visual attention and visual working memory on the other
hand are closely interrelated. Two experiments address the question whether
all three processes draw on the same spatial representations. Participants
had to memorize a target location for a subsequent memory-guided
saccade. During the memory interval, task-irrelevant distractors were briefly
flashed on some trials either near or remote to the memory target. Results
showed that the previously flashed distractors attract the saccade's landing
position. However, attraction was only found, if the distractor was presented
within a sector of ±20° around the target axis, but not if the distractor was
presented outside this sector. This effect strongly resembles the global
effect in which saccades are directed to intermediate locations between a
target and a simultaneously presented neighboring distractor stimulus. It is
argued that covert visual attention, eye movements, and visual working memory
recruit the same spatial mechanisms that can probably be ascribed to
attentional priority maps.
}}
- Please find file (try google scholar)
@article{todd2010perception,
title={The perception of 3D shape from texture based on directional width gradients},
author={Todd, J.T. and Thaler, L.},
journal={Journal of Vision},
volume={10},
number={5},
year={2010},
publisher={Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology}
annote = {
simulated textured 3D shapes are shown to subjects, who mark the local
maximas and minimas of depth along a scan line. two models of 3d
reconstruction are compared, and it is shown that the more correct one was
adopted by the users. - AM
[IDEA: Can be easily duplicated]
ABSTRACT: A new computational analysis is described that is capable of estimating the
3D shapes of continuously curved surfaces with anisotropic textures that are
viewed with negligible perspective. This analysis assumes that the surface
texture is homogeneous, and it makes specific predictions about how the
apparent shape of a surface should be distorted in cases where that
assumption is violated. Two psychophysical experiments are reported in an
effort to test those predictions, and the results confirm that observers’
ordinal shape judgments are consistent with what would be expected based on
the model. The limitations of this analysis are also considered, and a
complimentary model is discussed that is only appropriate for surfaces viewed
with large amounts of perspective.
}}
- Please find file (try google scholar)
@article{harrison-backus-10_necker-cube-disambiguation,
title={Disambiguating Necker cube rotation using a location cue: What types of spatial location signal can the visual system learn?},
author={Harrison, S. and Backus, B.},
journal={Journal of Vision},
volume={10},
number={6},
year={2010},
publisher={Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology}
abstract = {
[Can we explain this model computationally?]
The direction of rotation of a wire-frame (Necker) cube, which is
perceptually bistable, can be trained to depend on stimulus location
(Q. Haijiang, J. A. Saunders, R. W. Stone, & B. T. Backus, 2006). However, it
is not known which aspects of “location” are important to this learning. We
therefore explored “location” in a series of experiments that separately
assessed testing venue, location relative to the observer, and location in
the retinal image as types of location signal that could potentially be
recruited by the visual system. Subjects were trained using wire-frame cubes
with rotation direction disambiguated by depth cues. Training cubes were
presented at two locations, rotating in opposite directions. On interleaved
test trials, ambiguous monocular cubes were presented at the same two
locations. The extent to which test cubes were perceived to rotate according
to the trained location–rotation contingency was our measure of location-cue
recruitment. We found that only retinal position was recruited as a cue for
apparent rotation direction. Furthermore, the learned retinal location cue
was robust to ocular transfer. Our findings are consistent with a relatively
low-level site of learning, such as MT.
}}
- nieman-sheth-shimojo-10_perceiving-discontinuity-in-motion
@article{nieman-sheth-shimojo-10_perceiving-discontinuity-in-motion,
title={Perceiving a discontinuity in motion},
author={Nieman, D. and Sheth, B.R. and Shimojo, S.},
journal={Journal of Vision},
volume={10},
number={6},
year={2010},
publisher={Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology}
}
- ghose-palmer-10_extremal-edge-principles-of-figure-ground-organization.pdf
@article{ghose-palmer-10_extremal-edge-principles-of-figure-ground-organization,
title={Extremal edges versus other principles of figure-ground organization},
author={Ghose, T. and Palmer, S.E.},
journal={Journal of Vision},
volume={10},
number={8},
year={2010},
publisher={Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology},
abstract = {
[computational simulation of extremal edges? ]
Identifying the visual cues that determine
figure-ground organization [as depth change] is a central problem of vision
science. In this paper, we compare flat cues to figure-ground organization
with the recently discovered cue of extremal edges (EEs), which arise when
opaque convex surfaces smoothly curve to partly occlude themselves. The
present results show that EEs are very powerful pictorial cues to relative
depth across an edge, almost entirely dominating the well-known figure-ground
cues of relative size, convexity, shape familiarity, and
surroundedness. These results demonstrate that natural shading and texture
gradients in an image provide important information about figure-ground
organization that has largely been overlooked in the past 75 years of
research on this topic.
}}
- pinto-10_more-often-the--object-easier-to-track.pdf
@article{pinto-10_more-often-the--object-easier-to-track ,
author={Yair Pinto and Piers D. L. Howe and Michael A. Cohen and Todd S. Horowitz},
title={The more often you see an object, the easier it becomes to track it},
journal={Journal of Vision},
volume={10},
number={8},
year={2010},
annote = {
Can be explained in terms of better modeling of the repeatedly seen object.
The model may consist of patches (SIFT-like) which are pre-identified for the
class of objects being considered.
Apply to the tracking problem? - AM
ABSTRACT:
Is it easier to track objects that you have seen repeatedly? We compared
repeated blocks, where identities were the same from trial to trial, to
unrepeated blocks, where identities varied. People were better in tracking
objects that they saw repeatedly. We tested four hypotheses to explain this
repetition benefit. First, perhaps the repeated condition benefits from
consistent mapping of identities to target and distractor roles. However, the
repetition benefit persisted even when both the repeated and the unrepeated
conditions used consistent mapping. Second, repetition might improve the
ability to recover targets that have been lost, or swapped with
distractors. However, we observed a larger repetition benefit for color–color
conjunctions, which do not benefit from such error recovery processes, than
for unique features, which do. Furthermore, a repetition benefit was observed
even in the absence of distractors. Third, perhaps repetition frees up
resources by reducing memory load. However, increasing memory load by masking
identities during the motion phase reduced the repetition benefit. The fourth
hypothesis is that repetition facilitates identity tracking, which in turn
improves location tracking. This hypothesis is consistent with all our
results. Thus, our data suggest that identity and location tracking share a
common resource.
}}
- thomas-mareschal-10_light-from-above-convexity-priors-development.pdf
@article{thomas-mareschal-10_light-from-above-convexity-priors-development,
title={Interactions between “light-from-above” and convexity priors in visual development},
author={Thomas, R. and Nardini, M. and Mareschal, D.},
journal={Journal of Vision},
volume={10},
number={8},
year={2010},
publisher={Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology}
abstract = {
Having a prior assumption about where light originates can disambiguate
perceptual scenarios. Previous studies have reported that adult observers use
a “light-from-above” prior as well as a convexity prior to constrain
perception of shape from shading. Such priors may reflect information
acquired about the visual world, where objects tend to be convex and light
tends to come from above. In the current study, 4- to 12-year-olds and adults
made convex/concave judgements for a shaded “polo mint” stimulus. Their
judgments indicated an interaction between a “light-from-above” prior and a
convexity prior that changed over the course of development. Overall,
observers preferred to interpret the stimulus as lit from above and as mostly
convex. However, when these assumptions conflicted, younger children assumed
convexity, whereas older groups assumed a light from above. These results
show that both priors develop early but are reweighted during childhood. A
convexity prior dominates initially, while a “light-from-above” prior
dominates later and in adulthood. This may be because convexity can be judged
relative to the body, whereas judging the direction of light in the world
requires the use of an external frame of reference.
}}
- nuthmann-henderson-10_object-based attentional selection.pdf
@article{nuthmann-henderson-10_object-based attentional selection,
title={Object-based attentional selection in scene viewing},
author={Nuthmann, A. and Henderson, J.M.},
journal={Journal of Vision},
volume={10},
number={8},
year={2010},
publisher={Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology}
annote= {
how to build object-centred attention models in general scenes? or for fixed
axis rotating cameras?
CITE??
Two contrasting views of visual attention in scenes are the visual salience
and the cognitive relevance hypotheses. They fundamentally differ in their
conceptualization of the visuospatial representation over which attention is
directed. According to the saliency model, this representation is
image-based, while the cognitive relevance framework advocates an
object-based representation. Previous research has shown that (1) viewers
prefer to look at objects over background and that (2) the saliency model
predicts human fixation locations significantly better than chance. However,
it could be that saliency mainly acts through objects. To test this
hypothesis, we investigated where people fixate within real objects and
saliency proto-objects. To this end, we recorded eye movements of human
observers while they inspected photographs of natural scenes under different
task instructions. We found a preferred viewing location (PVL) close to the
center of objects within naturalistic scenes. Compared to the PVL for real
objects, there was less evidence for a PVL for human fixations within
saliency proto-objects. There was no evidence for a PVL when only saliency
proto-objects that did not spatially overlap with annotated real objects were
analyzed. The results suggest that saccade targeting and, by inference,
attentional selection in scenes is object-based.
}}
- kandil-rotter-10_car-drivers-attention-on-closed-vs-open-bends.pdf
@article{kandil-rotter-10_car-drivers-attention-on-closed-vs-open-bends,
title={Car drivers attend to different gaze targets when negotiating closed vs. open bends},
author={Kandil, F.I. and Rotter, A. and Lappe, M.},
journal={Journal of Vision},
volume={10},
number={4},
year={2010},
publisher={Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology}
annote = {
see image:
http://www.journalofvision.org/content/10/4/24/embed/icon-1.gif
On winding roads, car drivers have to control speed and steering angle in
order to keep the car in an optimal lane position. Among the strategies
proposed for steering regulation are the use of the tangent point, a
geometrical method, and gaze sampling, in which retinal flow lines obtained
by tracking a spot on the future road need to be assessed. Previous studies
used a variety of scenarios (real-road vs. simulator) and different road
designs (closed vs. open bends, different curvatures) and found results
speaking in favor of either strategy. Here, we investigate what effects the
openness of the bend, i.e. the sight distance of the driver, has on the
percentage with which drivers use the tangent point. Six drivers drove a test
car repeatedly through a series of twelve bends on real roads while their
eye-movements were recorded. Results show that the reliance on the tangent
point is generally high and increases with the closedness (shorter sight
distances) of the bend and higher curvature. In open bends they alternatively
look far into the straight road segments adjacent to the bend, but do not use
gaze sampling.
}}
- Please find file (try google scholar)
@article{lee2010comparison,
title={A comparison of global motion perception using a multiple-aperture stimulus},
author={Lee, A.L.F. and Lu, H.},
journal={Journal of Vision},
volume={10},
number={4},
year={2010},
annote = {
the visual system is more sensitive to circular or radial motion than
translation. Should be possible to duplicate? - AM
ABSTRACT
The human visual system integrates local motion signals to generate globally
coherent motion percepts. However, it is unclear whether the perception of
different types of global motion relies on a common motion integration
mechanism. Using the multiple-aperture stimulus developed by K. Amano,
M. Edwards, D. R. Badcock, and S. Nishida (2009), we compared the motion
sensitivity (in terms of coherence threshold) for translational, circular,
and radial motion. We found greater motion sensitivity for the two complex
(circular and radial) motion types than for translational motion, implying
that specific motion integration mechanisms are involved in the computation
for different motion types. Our results reveal a “complexity advantage” in
perceiving motion, which is consistent with physiological and computational
evidence suggesting that specific mechanisms exist for processing complex
circular/radial motion. We further examined the contributions of several
critical factors that influence human global motion sensitivity. We found
that human sensitivity for all motion types remained constant across a range
of motion sampling density but varied depending on global speed. The minimum
stimulus duration required for observers to reach constant sensitivity was
found to be short (È140 ms) for all motion types.
}}
- treder-meulenbroek-10_moving-dot-figures-w-symmetry}}.pdf
@article{treder-meulenbroek-10_moving-dot-figures-w-symmetry}},
title={Integration of structure-from-motion and symmetry during surface perception},
author={Treder, M.S. and Meulenbroek, R.G.J.},
journal={Journal of },
volume={10},
number={4},
year={2010},
publisher={Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology}
annote = {
moving dot patterns with symmetry (ambiguous?) induce novel 3D shapes.
what would the "form cues" be - surface continuity? - AM
image:
http://www.journalofvision.org/content/10/4/5/embed/icon-1.gif
ABSTRACT:
Sinusoidal motion of elements in a random-dot pattern can elicit a striking
percept of a rotating volume, a phenomenon known as structure-from-motion
(SFM). We demonstrate that if the dots defining the volume are 2D
mirror-symmetric, novel 3D interpretations arise. In addition to the
classical rotating cylinder, one can perceive mirror-symmetric, flexible
surfaces bending along the path of movement. In three experiments, we
measured the perceptual durations of the different interpretations in a
voluntary control task. The results suggest that motion signals and symmetry
signals are integrated during surface interpolation. Furthermore, the
competition between the rotating cylinder percept and the symmetric surfaces
percept is resolved at the level of surface perception rather than at the
level of individual stimulus elements. Concluding, structure-from-motion is
an interactive process that incorporates not only motion cues but also form
cues. The neurofunctional implication of this is that surface interpolation
is not fully completed in its designated neural “engine,” MT/V5, but rather
in a higher tier area such as LOC, which receives input from MT/V5 and which
is also involved in symmetry detection.
}}
- cavanagh-2010trics_visual-stability-attention.pdf
@article{cavanagh-2010trics_visual-stability-attention,
title={Visual stability based on remapping of attention pointers},
author={Patrick Cavanagh and Amelia R. Hunt and Arash Afraz and Martin Rolfs},
journal={Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
year={2010},
publisher={Elsevier}
pages ={147-153},
}
- gottlieb-balan-2010trics_attention-as-decision.pdf
@article{gottlieb-balan-2010trics_attention-as-decision,
title={Attention as a decision in information space},
author={Jacqueline Gottlieb and Puiu Balan},
journal={Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
year={2010},
publisher={Elsevier}
pages = {240-248},
}
- pereira-smith-09_visual-recognition-change-18-to-24mos.pdf
@article{pereira-smith-09_visual-recognition-change-18-to-24mos,
title={Developmental changes in visual object recognition between 18 and 24 months of age},
author={Alfredo F. Pereira and Linda B. Smith},
journal={Developmental Science},
volume={12},
number={1},
pages={67--80},
year={2009},
afpereir@indiana.edu
ABSTRACT
Two experiments examined developmental changes in children's visual
recognition of common objects during the period of 18 to 24
months. Experiment 1 examined children's ability to recognize common category
instances that presented three different kinds of information: (1) richly
detailed and prototypical instances that presented both local and global
shape information, color, textural and featural information, (2) the same
rich and prototypical shapes but no color, texture or surface featural
information, or (3) that presented only abstract and global representations
of object shape in terms of geometric volumes. Significant developmental
differences were observed only for the abstract shape representations in
terms of geometric volumes, the kind of shape representation that has been
hypothesized to underlie mature object recognition. Further, these
differences were strongly linked in individual children to the number of
object names in their productive vocabulary. Experiment 2 replicated these
results and showed further that the less advanced children's object
recognition was based on the piecemeal use of individual features and parts,
rather than overall shape. The results provide further evidence for
significant and rapid developmental changes in object recognition during the
same period children first learn object names. The implications of the
results for theories of visual object recognition, the relation of object
recognition to category learning, and underlying developmental processes are
discussed.
}}
==== LANGUAGE ====
- friederici-09_pathways-to-language-fiber-tracts-in-the-human-brain.pdf
@article{friederici-09_pathways-to-language-fiber-tracts-in-the-human-brain,
title={Pathways to language: fiber tracts in the human brain},
author={Friederici, A.D.},
journal={Trends in cognitive sciences},
volume={13},
number={4},
pages={175--181},
year={2009},
publisher={Elsevier}
annote = {
reviews the structures in the brain - not only the brocas area (temporal
lobe) and other areas (frontal lobe) - but some role may be played also by
pathways connecting these, which are not very prominent in non-human
primates, and are less developed in children. - AM
ABSTRACT:
The human language function is not only based on the grey matter of
circumscribed brain regions in the frontal and the temporal cortex but
moreover on the white matter fiber tracts connecting these regions. Different
pathways connecting frontal and temporal cortex have been identified. The
dorsal pathway projecting from the posterior portion of Broca’s area to the
superior temporal region seems to be of particular importance for
higher-order language functions. This pathway is particularly weak in
non-human compared to human primates and in children compared to adults. It
is therefore considered to be crucial for the evolution of human language,
which is characterized by the ability to process syntactically complex
sentences.
}}
- borensztajn-zuidema-bod-09cogsci_parsing-neural-theory-of-grammar-acquisition.pdf
@conference{borensztajn-zuidema-bod-09cogsci_parsing-neural-theory-of-grammar-acquisition,
title = {The hierarchical prediction network: towards a neural
theory of grammar acquisition},
author = {Borensztajn, G. and Zuidema, W. and Bod, R.},
booktitle = {Proc. of the 31th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science
Society},
year = {2009},
annote = {
Extends normal neural network structures by allowing a substitution operation between the nodes.
demonstrates grammar learning on an artificial language generated by a PCFG,
but more interestingly, on a subset of the Eve data in CHILDES, a large
corpus of the first utterances by many children over the years. The result
of this analysis is a set of associations, it seems, of words that are likely
to be in similar categories (?maybe) - AM
borensztajn-zuidema-bod-09cogsci_parsing-neural-theory-of-grammar-acquisition.pdf
... biologically inspired computational framework for language processing and
grammar acquisition, called the hierarchical prediction network
(HPN). extends power of connectionist networks by allowing for a substitution
operation between the nodes of the network. This, and its hierarchical
architecture, enable HPN to function as a full syntactic parser, able to
emulate context free grammars without necessarily employing a discrete notion
of categories. Rather, HPN maintains a graded and topological representation
of categories, which can be incrementally learned in an unsupervised
manner. We argue that the formation of topologies, that occurs in the
learning process of HPN, offers a neurally plausible explanation for the
categorization and abstraction process in general. We apply HPN to the task
of semi-supervised ‘grammar induction’ from bracketed sentences, and
demonstrate how a topological arrangement of lexical and phrasal category
representations successfully emerges
distinguishes from the main ANN based approach to grammar - Elman's simple
recuurent network (SRN) and variants.
Hawkins, J., & Blakeslee, S. (2004). On intelligence. New York: Henry
Holt and Company
}}
- vidyasagar-pammer-10_dyslexia-is-a-deficit-in-visual-attention-not-phonology.pdf
@article{vidyasagar-pammer-10_dyslexia-is-a-deficit-in-visual-attention-not-phonology,
title={Dyslexia: a deficit in visuo-spatial attention, not in phonological processing},
author={Vidyasagar, T.R. and Pammer, K.},
journal={Trends in cognitive sciences},
year={2010},
publisher={Elsevier}
pages = {57-63},
}
- arunachalam-waxman-10_language-and-conceptual-development.pdf
@article{arunachalam-waxman-10_language-and-conceptual-development,
title={Language and conceptual development},
author={Arunachalam, S. and Waxman, S.R.},
journal={Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science},
publisher={John Wiley \& Sons}
year = 2010,
page = {548–558},
annote = {
ABSTRACT
Linguistic and conceptual development converge crucially in the process of early
word learning. Acquiring a new word requires the child to identify a conceptual
unit, identify a linguistic unit, and establish a mapping between them. On the
conceptual side, the child has to not only identify the relevant part of the scene
being labeled, but also isolate a concept at the correct level of abstraction—the
word ‘dog’ must be mapped to the concept dog and not to the concepts petting or
collie, for example. On the linguistic side, the child must use the syntactic context
in which the word appears to determine its grammatical category (e.g., noun, verb,
adjective). But she also uses syntactic information, along with observation of the
world and social-communicative cues, to make guesses at which concept the word
picks out as well as its level of abstraction. Wepresent evidence that young learners
learn new words rapidly and extend them appropriately. However, the relative
import of observational and linguistic cues varies as a function of the kind of word
being acquired, with verbs requiring a richer set of conceptual and linguistic cues
than nouns.
}
- bunger-08_how-we-learn-event-verbs-conceptual-constraints.pdf
@article{bunger-08_how-we-learn-event-verbs-conceptual-constraints,
title={How we learn to talk about events: Linguistic and conceptual constraints on verb learning},
author={Bunger, A.},
journal={Language Acquisition},
volume={15},
number={1},
pages={69--71},
year={2008},
publisher={Psychology Press}
}
- ma-golinkoff-08_imageability-chinese-verbs.pdf
@article{ma-golinkoff-08_imageability-chinese-verbs,
title={Imageability predicts the age of acquisition of verbs in Chinese children},
author={Ma, W. and Golinkoff, R.M. and Hirsh-Pasek, K. and McDonough, C. and Tardif, T.},
journal={Journal of child language},
volume={36},
number={02},
pages={405--423},
year={2008},
publisher={Cambridge Univ Press}
annote = {
Uses a measure called "imageability" to compare the learnability of verbs.
imageability = ability of a word to produce a mental image.
words that are more "imageable" are seen to be easier to learn, in terms of
age of acquisition.
Chinese adults rated the imageability of Chinese words from the Chinese
Communicative Development Inventory (Tardif et al., in press). Imageability
ratings were a reliable predictor of age of acquisition in Chinese for both
nouns and verbs. Furthermore, whereas early Chinese and English nouns do NOT
differ in imageability, verbs receive higher imageability ratings in Chinese
than in English. Compared with input frequency, imageability independently
accounts for a portion of the variance in age of acquisition (AoA) of verb
learning in Chinese and English.
}}
- christophe-bernal-08_bootstrapping-lexical-syntactic-acquisition.pdf
@article{christophe-bernal-08_bootstrapping-lexical-syntactic-acquisition,
title={Bootstrapping lexical and syntactic acquisition},
author={Christophe, A. and Millotte, S. and Bernal, S. and Lidz, J.},
journal={Language and Speech},
volume={51},
number={1-2},
pages={61},
year={2008}
focuses on how phrasal prosody and function words may interact during early
language acquisition. Experimental results show that infants have access to
intermediate prosodic phrases (phonological phrases) during the first year of
life, and use these to constrain lexical segmentation. These same
intermediate prosodic phrases are used by adults to constrain on-line
syntactic analysis. In addition, by two years of age infants can exploit
function words to infer the syntactic category of unknown content words
(nouns vs. verbs) and guess their plausible meaning (object vs. action). We
speculate on how infants may build a partial syntactic structure by relying
on both phonological phrase boundaries and function words, and present adult
results that test the plausibility of this hypothesis. These results are tied
together within a model of the architecture of the first stages of language
processing, and their acquisition.
}}
- chemla-mintz-bernal-09_devSci_frequent-frames-lang-acquisition.pdf
@article{chemla-mintz-bernal-09_devSci_frequent-frames-lang-acquisition,
title={Categorizing words using 'frequent frames': what cross-linguistic analyses reveal about distributional acquisition strategies},
author={Chemla, E. and Mintz, T.H. and Bernal, S. and Christophe, A.},
journal={Developmental Science},
volume={12},
number={3},
pages={396--406},
year={2009},
annote = {
--- TALK Jul 3 Bungehuis
Toben Mintz (University of Southern California)
Categorizing Words from Patterns in the Linguistic Input
Considers 3-grams as models in which a child learns the middle word (target)
from other two.
Lexical frames - target word in the middle is constrained by words on both
sides. works well for french / english, poorly for Turkish.
This is because Turkish is highly inflected, and word order is not as
important.
In Turkish - morpheme order
Ekinin uykusumu geldi
Ekin-GEN uyku-POSS gel-PAST
GEN-POSS - is a frequent frame - 5:2 to others
morpheme order results in much better accuracy compared to chance.
interestingly, the previous morpheme is connected to the previous word and
not the following word; so 3-word order may not be as useful.
running a bi-gram analysis - accuracy falls; so the previous morpheme is
informative.
90% of the frames are accounted for by the top four categories
english e.g. --> [We eat the] cheese sandwich
ABSTRACT (talk):
Grammatical categories such as noun, verb, adjective, etc., are the building
blocks of syntactic structure. A crucial question in language acquisition
research is how learners initially group words into categories. One
possibility that has gained empirical support is that learners attend to
distributional information--co-occurrence patterns of words and bound
morphemes--categorizing words together that occur in similar environments
(e.g., words that occur after "the" and "a", etc.). In my lab we have been
studying distributional patterns in child-directed speech and have discovered
a particular kind of distributional pattern, called a frequent frame, that
categorizes words very accurately. I will present a series of computational
analyses of typologically distinct languages that demonstrate the
informativeness of frequent frames cross-linguistically. I will also discuss
behavioral studies with adults and infants suggesting that learners use
frequent frames to categorize words.
Finally, I will discuss findings from preliminary investigations into why
frequent frames are efficient categorizing environments.
---
Abstract
Mintz (2003) described a distributional environment called a frame, defined
as the co-occurrence of two context words with one intervening target
word. Analyses of English child-directed speech showed that words that fell
within any frequently occurring frame consistently belonged to the same
grammatical category (e.g. noun, verb, adjective, etc.). In this paper, we
first generalize this result to French, a language in which the function word
system allows patterns that are potentially detrimental to a framebased
analysis procedure. Second, we show that the discontinuity of the chosen
environments (i.e. the fact that target words are framed by the context
words) is crucial for the mechanism to be efficient. This property might be
relevant for any computational approach to grammatical
categorization. Finally, we investigate a recursive application of the
procedure and observe that the categorization is paradoxically worse when
context elements are categories rather than actual lexical
items. Item-specificity is thus also a core computational principle for this
type of algorithm. Our analysis, along with results from behavioural studies
(Gómez, 2002; Gómez and Maye, 2005; Mintz, 2006), provides strong support for
frames as a basis for the acquisition of grammatical categories by
infants. Discontinuity and item-specificity appear to be crucial features.
}}
- mcmurray-hollich-09_statistical-learning-lang-acquisition.pdf
@article{mcmurray-hollich-09_statistical-learning-lang-acquisition,
title={Core computational principles of language acquisition: can statistical learning do the job? Introduction to Special Section},
author={McMurray, B. and Hollich, G.},
journal={Developmental Science},
volume={12},
number={3},
pages={365--368},
year={2009},
}}
- Please find file (try google scholar)
@conference{wang-mintz-07_categorizing-words-using-frames,
title={A Dynamic Learning Model for Categorizing Words Using Frames},
author={Wang, H. and Mintz, T.H.},
booktitle={Proceedings of BUCLD},
volume={32},
pages={525--536},
year={2007}
}
-
Please find file (try google scholar)
@article{bernal-07_syntax-constrains-acquisition-of-verb-meaning,
title={Syntax constrains the acquisition of verb meaning},
author={Bernal, S. and Lidz, J. and Millotte, S. and Christophe, A.},
journal={Language Learning and Development},
volume={3},
number={4},
pages={325--341},
year={2007},
publisher={Psychology Press}
ABSTRACT:
Can infants use the syntactic context of an unknown word to infer that it is a verb, and
thus refers to an action? 23-month-old French infants watching a moving object were taught
novel verbs, within sentences that contained only function words (“il poune par là” / “it’s
pooning there”). Infants then watched two instances of the object undergoing either the
familiar or a novel action and were asked to point towards the screen matching the novel verb.
Infants correctly pointed more often towards the familiar action. To check that they did not
simply perseverate in pointing at the familiar scene, control infants were taught novel nouns
on the same visual stimuli (“un poune est là”/ “a poon is here”). Contrary to verb-learning
infants, noun-learning infants pointed more often to the novel action. These results confirm
the hypothesis that function words, and more generally syntactic structure, support early
lexical acquisition.
}}
- Please find file (try google scholar)
@article{tenenbaum2009fragment,
title={Fragment Grammars: Exploring Computation and Reuse in Language},
author={Timothy J. O’Donnell and Noah D. Goodman and Joshua B. Tenenbaum},
journal={MIT-CSAIL-TR-2009-013},
year={2009}
email = {timo@wjh.harvard.edu},
Language relies on a division of labor between stored units and structure
building operations which combine the stored units into larger structures. This
division of labor leads to a tradeoff: more structure-building means less need
to store while more storage means less need to compute structure. We develop
a hierarchical Bayesian model called fragment grammar to explore the optimum
balance between structure-building and reuse. The model is developed
in the context of stochastic functional programming (SFP), and in particular,
using a probabilistic variant of Lisp known as the Church programming language
[17]. We show how to formalize several probabilistic models of language
structure using Church, and how fragment grammar generalizes one of them—
adaptor grammars [21]. We conclude with experimental data with adults and
preliminary evaluations of the model on natural language corpus data.
}}
- evans-levinson-09bbs_myth-of-language-universals.pdf
@article{evans-levinson-09bbs_myth-of-language-universals,
title={The myth of language universals: Language diversity and its importance for cognitive science},
author={Evans, N. and Levinson, S.C.},
journal={Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
volume={32},
number={05},
pages={429--448},
year={2009},
publisher={Cambridge Univ Press}
annote= {
ABSTRACT :
Talk of linguistic universals has given cognitive scientists the
impression that languages are all built to a common pattern. In fact, there
are vanishingly few universals of language in the direct sense that all
languages exhibit them. Instead, diversity can be found at almost every level
of linguistic organization. This fundamentally changes the object of enquiry
from a cognitive science perspective. This target article summarizes decades
of cross-linguistic work by typologists and descriptive linguists, showing
just how few and unprofound the universal characteristics of language are,
once we honestly confront the diversity offered to us by the world’s 6,000 to
8,000 languages. After surveying the various uses of “universal,” we
illustrate the ways languages vary radically in sound, meaning, and syntactic
organization, and then we examine in more detail the core grammatical
machinery of recursion, constituency, and grammatical relations. Although
there are significant recurrent patterns in organization, these are better
explained as stable engineering solutions satisfying multiple design
constraints, reflecting both cultural-historical factors and the constraints
of human cognition.
Linguistic diversity then becomes the crucial datum for cognitive science: we
are the only species with a communication system that is fundamentally
variable at all levels. Recognizing the true extent of structural diversity
in human language opens up exciting new research directions for cognitive
scientists, offering thousands of different natural experiments given by
different languages, with new opportunities for dialogue with biological
paradigms concerned with change and diversity, and confronting us with the
extraordinary plasticity of the highest human skills.
According to Chomsky, a visiting Martian scientist would surely
conclude that aside from their mutually unintelligible vocabularies,
Earthlings speak a single language.
— Steven Pinker (1994, p. 232)
}}
- waxman-gelman-09_early-word-learning-both-reference-and-association.pdf
@article{waxman-gelman-09_early-word-learning-both-reference-and-association,
title={Early word-learning entails reference, not merely associations},
author={Waxman, S.R. and Gelman, S.A.},
journal={Trends in cognitive sciences},
volume={13},
number={6},
pages={258--263},
year={2009},
annote = {
contrasts associative learning approaches to lang acq with theory-based
(learn rules of behaviour). but argues that the rules are learned together
with the associations. I would fully agree. - AM
from ABSTRACT:
classic tensions in research on the acquisition
of words and concepts: pit one type of content
against another (perceptual versus conceptual) and one type of process
against another (associative versus theory-based). But these dichotomies are
false; they rest upon insufficient consideration of the structure and
diversity of the words and concepts that we naturally acquire. As infants and
young children establish categories and acquire words to describe them, they
take advantage of both perceptual and conceptual information, and relate this
to both the (rudimentary) theories they hold and the statistics that they
witness.
Two metaphors of development
Two different metaphors undergird recent work on early cognitive and language
development. The ‘child-as-data-analyst’ metaphor captures human infants’
impressive capacity to attend to statistical regularities in their
environments [1] and [2], and the rich sensory, perceptual and computational
resources that they bring to the task of acquisition. The ‘child-as-theorist’
metaphor captures infants’ impressive array of conceptual capacities,
including core knowledge of physical objects, skeletal theories of animate
objects and a sensitivity to the distinct principles governing the behavior
of each [3], [4], [5], [6] and [7].
The basic thesis of this article is simple: these two metaphors should not be
in competition. As infants and young children establish concepts and acquire
words to describe them, they rely on both the (rudimentary) theories that
they hold and the statistics that they witness [8], [9], [10] and [11]. This
might seem like an uncontroversial point, and indeed it has been embraced by
researchers across a broad theoretical spectrum, including those focusing
primarily on at the perceptual and the conceptual ends of the spectrum [11],
[12], [13], [14] and [15]. Of course, this does not mean that researchers now
speak in a single voice. On the contrary, strong differences remain on
matters as fundamental as whether our conceptual capacities arise from a
bedrock of perceptual primitives or are built upon conceptual primitives
(including domain-specific frameworks for interpreting data).
Nonetheless, ... Strong
endorsements for using the child-as-data-analyst metaphor alone persist:
‘…early in development, cognitive processes do not depend on top-down
conceptual knowledge. Instead, they are grounded in powerful learning
mechanisms…’ ([16], p. 180, emphasis added).
1 Xu, F. and Tenenbaum, J.B. (2007) Sensitivity to sampling in Bayesian word
learning. Dev. Sci. 10, 288–297
2 Rakison, D.H. and Lupyan, G. (2008) Developing object concepts in infancy:
An associative learning perspective. SRCD Monographs
3 Baillargeon, R. (2008) Innate ideas revisited: for a principle of
persistence in infants’ physical reasoning. Perspectives on Psychological
Science 3, 2–13
4 Spelke, E.S. (2000) Core knowledge. Am. Psychol. 55, 1233–1243
5 Carey, S. (2009) The origin of concepts. Oxford University Press
6 Gelman, R. and Williams, E.M. (1998). Enabling constraints for cognitive
development and learning: domain specificity and epigenesis. In Handbook
of child psychology: Cognition, perception, and language (Volume 2, 4th
edition) (Kuhn, D. and Siegler, R., eds), pp. 575–630, Wiley
7 Wellman, H.M. and Gelman, S.A. (1998). Knowledge acquisition. In Handbook
of child psychology: cognition, perception, and language (Vol. 2, 4th
edition) (Kuhn, D. and Siegler, R., eds), pp. 523–573, Wiley
8 Gelman, S.A. and Kalish, C.W. (2006). Conceptual development. In Handbook
of child psychology: cognition, perception, and language (Vol. 2, 6th
edition) (Kuhn, D. and Siegler, R. S., eds), pp. 687–733, Wiley
9 Waxman, S.R. and Lidz, J.L. (2006). Early word learning. In Handbook
of child psychology: cognition, perception, and language (Vol. 2, 6th
edition) (Kuhn, D. and Siegler, R. S., eds), pp. 299–335, Wiley
10 Gopnik, A. and Schulz, L. (2007) Causal learning: psychology, philosophy,
and computation. Oxford University Press
11 Hollich, G.J. et al. (2000). Breaking the language barrier: an emergentist
coalition model for the origins of word learning. Monographs of the
society for research in child development, 65.(3, Serial No. 262)
12 Colunga, E. and Smith, L.B. (2005) From the lexicon to expectations about
kinds: a role for associative learning. Psychol. Rev. 112, 347–382
13 Booth, A.E. and Waxman, S.R. (2006) Deja vu all over again: re-revisiting
the conceptual status of early word learning: Comment on Smith and
Samuelson (2006). Dev. Psychol. 42, 1344–1346
14 Samuelson, L.K. and Bloom, P. (2008) The shape of controversy: what counts
as an explanantion of development? Introduction to the Special
Section. Dev. Sci. 11, 183–184
15 Smith, L.B. and Samuelson, L. (2006) An attentional learning account of
the shape bias: Reply to Cimpian and Markman (2005) and Booth, Waxman, and
Huang (2005). Dev. Psychol. 42, 1339–1343
16 Sloutsky, V.M. et al. (2007) When looks are everything: appearance
similarity versus kind information in early induction. Psychol. Sci. 18,
179–185 --> see debate in 55 below.
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17 Sloutsky, V.M. et al. (2001)How much does a shared name make things
similar? Linguistic Labels, Similarity and the Development of Inductive
Inference. Child Dev. 72, 1695–1709
18 Sloutsky, V.M. and Robinson, C.W. (2008) The role of words and sounds in
visual processing: from overshadowing to attentional tuning. Cogn.
Sci. 32, 354–377
19 Sloutsky, V.M. (2003) The role of similarity in the development of
categorization. Trends Cogn. Sci. 7, 246–251
20 Gopnik, A. and Meltzoff, A.N. (1997) Words, thoughts, and theories.
Bradford Books/MIT Press, (Cambridge, MA)
21 Gleitman, L.R. et al. (2005) Hard words. Language Learning and Development
1, 23–64
22 Putnam, H. (1973) Meaning and reference. J. Philos. 70, 699–711
23 Fennell, C.T. et al. (2007). With referential cues, infants successfully
use phonetic detail in word learning. Proceedings of the 31st Boston
University Conference on Language Development. Somerville, MA: Cascadilla
Press
24 Lyons, J. (1977) Semantics: 1. Cambridge University Press, (New York)
25 Cimpian, A. and Markman, E.M. (2008) Preschool children’s use of cues to
generic meaning. Cognition 107, 19–53
26 Gelman, S.A. (2004) Learning words for kinds: generic noun phrases in
acquisition. In Weaving a lexicon (Hall, D.G. and Waxman, S.R., eds),
pp. 445–484, MIT Press
27 Leslie, S.J. (2008) Generics: Cognition and acquisition. Philos. Rev 117,
1–49
28 Chambers, C.G. et al. (2008) When hearsay trumps evidence: How generic
language guides preschoolers’ inferences about unfamiliar
things. Lang. Cogn. Process. 23, 749–766
29 Prasada, I.I. (2000) Acquiring generic knowledge. Trends Cogn. Sci. 4,
66–72
30 Preissler, M.A. and Carey, S. (2004) Do both pictures and words function
as symbols for 18- and 24-month-old children? J. Cogn. Dev. 5, 185–212
31 Gelman, S.A. (2003) The essential child: Origins of essentialism in
everyday thought. Oxford University Press
32 Graham, S.A. et al. (2004) Thirteen-month-olds rely on shared labels
and shape similarity for inductive inferences. Child Dev. 75, 409–427
33 Keates, J. and Graham, S.A. (2009) Category markers or attributes:
why do labels guide infants’ inductive inferences? Psychol. Sci. 19,
1287–1293
34 Ganea, P.A. et al. (2007) Thinking of things unseen: infants’ use
of language to update mental representations. Psychol. Sci. 18, 734–
739
35 Gopnik, A. and Sobel, D.M. (2000) Detecting blickets: how young
children use information about novel causal powers in
categorization and induction. Child Dev. 71, 1205–1222
36 Legare, C.H. et al. (2008). The function of causal explanatory
reasoning. Proceedings of the 30th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
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37 Gelman, S.A. and Bloom, P. (2000) Young children are sensitive to how
an object was created when deciding what to name it. Cognition 76 (2),
91–103
38 Kelemen, D. (1999) Functions, goals and intentions: children’s
teleological reasoning about objects. Trends Cogn. Sci. 12, 461–468
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206–217
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41 Hall, D.G. and Lavin, T. (2004) The use and misuse of part-ofspeech
information in word learning. In Weaving a Lexicon (Hall,
D.G. and Waxman, S.R., eds), MIT Press
42 Booth, A.E. et al. (2005) Conceptual information permeates word
learning in infancy. Dev. Psychol. 41, 491–505
43 Gergely, G. et al. (2007) On pedagogy. Dev. Sci. 10, 139–146
44 Gelman, S.A. (2009) Learning from others: children’s construction of
concepts. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 60, 115–140
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false statements. Psychol. Sci. 15, 694–698
46 Baldwin, D.A. (1995) Understanding the link between joint attention
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(Moore, C. and Dunham, P.J., eds), pp. 131–158, Lawrence Erlbaum
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47 Jaswal, V.K. (2004) Don’t believe everything you hear: preschoolers’
sensitivity to speaker intent in category induction. Child Dev. 75,
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48 Namy, L.L. andWaxman, S.R. (2000) Naming and exclaiming: infants’
sensitivity to naming contexts. J. Cogn. Dev. 1, 405–428
49 Woodward, A.L. and Hoyne, K.L. (1999) Infants’ learning about words
and sounds in relation to objects. Child Dev. 70, 65–77
50 Waxman, S.R. and Markow, D.B. (1995) Words as invitations to form
categories: evidence from 12- to 13-month-old infants. Cognit. Psychol.
29, 257–302
51 Fulkerson, A.L. and Waxman, S.R. (2007) Words (but not tones)
facilitate object categorization: evidence from 6- and 12-month-olds.
Cognition 105, 218–228
52 Waxman, S.R. and Braun, I.E. (2005) Consistent (but not variable)
names as invitations to form object categories: new evidence from 12-
month-old infants. Cognition 95, B59–B68
53 Booth, A.E. and Waxman, S.R. (2009) A horse of a different color:
specifying with precision infants’ mappings of novel nouns and
adjectives. Child Dev. 80, 15–22
54 Mill, J.S. (1843) A system of logic, ratiocinative and inductive. Longmans
55 Gelman, S.A. and Waxman, S.R. (2007) Looking beyond looks:
Comments on Sloutsky, Kloos & Fisher, When looks are everything:
appearance similarity versus kind information in early induction.
Psychol. Sci. 18, 554–555
}}
- sommerville-crane-09_use-identify-goals-using-prior-10mos.pdf
@article{sommerville-crane-09_use-identify-goals-using-prior-10mos,
author={Jessica A. Sommerville and Catharyn C. Crane},
title={Ten-month-old infants use prior information to identify an actor's goal},
journal={Developmental Science},
volume={12},
number={2},
pages={314--325},
year={2009},
For adults, prior information about an individual's likely goals,
preferences or dispositions plays a powerful role in interpreting ambiguous
behavior and predicting and interpreting behavior in novel contexts. Across
two studies, we investigated whether 10-month-old infants' ability to
identify the goal of an ambiguous action sequence was facilitated by seeing
prior instances in which the actor directly pursued and obtained her goal,
and whether infants could use this prior information to understand the
actor's behavior in a new context. Experiment 1 demonstrated that the goal
preview impacted infants' subsequent action understanding, but only if the
preview was delivered in the same room as the subsequent action
sequence. Experiment 2 demonstrated that infants' failure to transfer prior
goal information across situations arose from a change in the room per se
and not other features of the task. Our results suggest that infants may use
their understanding of simple actions as a leverage point for understanding
novel or ambiguous actions, but that their ability to do so is limited to
certain types of contextual changes.
}}
- goksun-hirshP-golinkoff-10_carving-up-events-for-learning.pdf
@article{goksun-hirshP-golinkoff-10_carving-up-events-for-learning,
title={Trading Spaces: Carving Up Events for Learning},
author={Goksun, T. and Hirsh-Pasek, K. and Golinkoff, R.M.},
journal={Perspectives on Psychological Science},
volume={5},
number={1},
pages={33--42},
year={2010}
annote = {
Abstract
Relational terms (e.g., verbs and prepositions) are the cornerstone of
language development, bringing together two distinct fields: linguistic
theory and infants’ event processing. To acquire relational terms such as
run, walk, in, and on, infants must first perceive and conceptualize
components of dynamic events such as containment–support, path–manner,
source–goal, and figure–ground. Infants must then uncover how the particular
language they are learning encodes these constructs. This review addresses
the interaction of language learning with infants’ conceptualization of these
nonlinguistic spatial event components. We present the thesis that infants
start with language-general nonlinguistic constructs that are gradually
refined and tuned to the requirements of their native language. In effect,
infants are trading spaces, maintaining their sensitivity to some relational
distinctions while dampening other distinctions, depending on how their
native language expresses these constructs.
}}
==== BRAIN ====
- Please find file (try google scholar)
@article{raichle2010two,
title={Two views of brain function},
author={Marcus E. Raichle},
journal={Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
year={2010},
publisher={Elsevier}
pages ={180-190},
abstract = {
Traditionally studies of brain function have focused on task-evoked
responses. By their very nature, such experiments tacitly encourage a
reflexive view of brain function. Although such an approach has been
remarkably productive, it ignores the alternative possibility that brain
functions are mainly intrinsic, involving information processing for
interpreting, responding to and predicting environmental demands. Here I
argue that the latter view best captures the essence of brain function, a
position that accords well with the allocation of the brain's energy
resources. Recognizing the importance of intrinsic activity will require
integrating knowledge from cognitive and systems neuroscience with cellular
and molecular neuroscience where ion channels, receptors, components of
signal transduction and metabolic pathways are all in a constant state of
flux.
---
The Brain's Dark Energy; March 2010; Scientific American Magazine; by
Marcus E. Raichle;
Imagine you are almost dozing in a lounge chair outside, with a magazine on
your lap. Suddenly, a fly lands on your arm. You grab the magazine and swat
at the insect. What was going on in your brain after the fly landed? And what
was going on just before? Many neuroscientists have long assumed that much of
the neural activity inside your head when at rest matches your subdued,
somnolent mood. In this view, the activity in the resting brain represents
nothing more than random noise, akin to the snowy pattern on the television
screen when a station is not broadcasting. Then, when the fly alights on your
forearm, the brain focuses on the conscious task of squashing the bug. But
recent analysis produced by neuroimaging technologies has revealed something
quite remarkable: a great deal of meaningful activity is occurring in the
brain when a person is sitting back and doing nothing at all.
It turns out that when your mind is at rest—when you are daydreaming quietly
in a chair, say, asleep in a bed or anesthetized for surgery—dispersed brain
areas are chattering away to one another. And the energy consumed by this
ever active messaging, known as the brain’s default mode, is about 20 times
that used by the brain when it responds consciously to a pesky fly or
another outside stimulus. Indeed, most things we do consciously, be it
sitting down to eat dinner or making a speech, mark a departure from the
baseline activity of the brain default mode.
}}
- oakley-halligan-09trics_hypnotic-suggestion-cog-neuroscience.pdf
@article{oakley-halligan-09trics_hypnotic-suggestion-cog-neuroscience,
title={Hypnotic suggestion and cognitive neuroscience},
author={Oakley, D.A. and Halligan, P.W.},
journal={Trends in cognitive sciences},
volume={13},
number={6},
pages={264--270},
year={2009},
publisher={Elsevier}
annote =
ABSTRACT
The growing acceptance of consciousness as a legitimate field of enquiry and
the availability of functional imaging has rekindled research interest in the
use of hypnosis and suggestion to manipulate subjective experience and to
gain insights into healthy and pathological cognitive functioning. Current
research forms two strands. The first comprises studies exploring the
cognitive and neural nature of hypnosis itself. The second employs hypnosis
to explore known psychological processes using specifically targeted
suggestions. An extension of this second approach involves using hypnotic
suggestion to create clinically informed analogues of established structural
and functional neuropsychological disorders. With functional imaging, this
type of experimental neuropsychopathology offers a productive means of
investigating brain activity involved in many symptom-based disorders and
their related phenomenology.
}}
- gazzola-2007neuro_mirror-neuron-responds-to-robotic-actions.pdf
@article{gazzola-2007neuro_mirror-neuron-responds-to-robotic-actions,
title={The anthropomorphic brain: The mirror neuron system responds to human and robotic actions},
author={Gazzola, V. and Rizzolatti, G. and Wicker, B. and Keysers, C.},
journal={Neuroimage},
volume={35},
number={4},
pages={1674--1684},
year={2007},
publisher={Elsevier}
abstract = {
In humans and monkeys the mirror neuron system transforms seen actions into
our inner representation of these actions. Here we asked if this system
responds also if we see an industrial robot perform similar actions. We
localised the motor areas involved in the execution of hand actions,
presented the same subjects blocks of movies of humans or robots perform a
variety of actions. The mirror system was activated strongly by the sight of
both human and robotic actions, with no significant differences between these
two agents. Finally we observed that seeing a robot perform a single action
repeatedly within a block failed to activate the mirror system. This latter
finding suggests that previous studies may have failed to find mirror
activations to robotic actions because of the repetitiveness of the presented
actions. Our findings suggest that the mirror neuron system could contribute
to the understanding of a wider range of actions than previously assumed, and
that the goal of an action might be more important for mirror activations
than the way in which the action is performed.
}}
- newman-2007nature-mirror-neuron.pdf
@article{newman-2007nature-mirror-neuron,
title={The mirror neuron system is more active during complementary compared with imitative action},
author={Newman-Norlund, R.D. and van Schie, H.T. and van Zuijlen, A.M.J. and Bekkering, H.},
journal={Nature neuroscience},
volume={10},
number={7},
pages={817--818},
year={2007},
publisher={Nature Publishing Group}
abstract =
We assessed the role of the human mirror neuron system (MNS) in complementary
actions using functional magnetic resonance imaging while participants
prepared to execute imitative or complementary actions. The BOLD signal in
the right inferior frontal gyrus and bilateral inferior parietal lobes was
greater during preparation of complementary than during imitative actions,
suggesting that the MNS may be essential in dynamically coupling action
observation to action execution.
}}
- kyriacou-hastings-2010trics_circadian-clocks-sleep-cognition.pdf
@article{kyriacou-hastings-2010trics_circadian-clocks-sleep-cognition,
title={Circadian clocks: genes, sleep, and cognition},
author={Charalambos P. Kyriacou and Michael H. Hastings},
journal={Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
year={2010},
publisher={Elsevier}
pages= {259-267},
}
- caggiano-09science_mirror-neurons.pdf
@article{caggiano-09science_mirror-neurons,
title={Mirror neurons differentially encode the peripersonal and extrapersonal space of monkeys},
author={Caggiano, V. and Fogassi, L. and Rizzolatti, G. and Thier, P. and Casile, A.},
journal={science},
volume={324},
number={5925},
pages={403},
year={2009},
annote = {
Actions performed by others may have different relevance for the observer,
and thus lead to different behavioral responses, depending on the regions of
space in which they are executed. We found that in rhesus monkeys, the
premotor cortex neurons activated by both the execution and the observation
of motor acts (mirror neurons) are differentially modulated by the location
in space of the observed motor acts relative to the monkey, with about half
of them preferring either the monkey’s peripersonal or extrapersonal space. A
portion of these spatially selective mirror neurons encode space according to
a metric representation, whereas other neurons encode space in operational
terms, changing their properties according to the possibility that the monkey
will interact with the object. These results suggest that a set of mirror
neurons encodes the observed motor acts not only for action understanding,
but also to analyze such acts in terms of features that are relevant to
generating appropriate behaviors
}}
- aimone-2010trics_adult-neurogenesis-hippocampus.pdf
@article{aimone-2010trics_adult-neurogenesis-hippocampus,
title={Adult neurogenesis: integrating theories and separating functions},
author={Aimone, J.B. and Deng, W. and Gage, F.H.},
journal={Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
year={2010},
publisher={Elsevier}
}
- nir-tononi-10_dreaming-neurophysiology.pdf
@article{nir-tononi-10_dreaming-neurophysiology,
title={Dreaming and the brain: from phenomenology to neurophysiology},
author={Yuval Nir and Giulio Tononi, }
journal={Trends in cognitive sciences},
year={2010},
Dreams are a remarkable experiment in psychology and neuroscience, conducted
every night in every sleeping person. They show that the human brain,
disconnected from the environment, can generate an entire world of conscious
experiences by itself. Content analysis and developmental studies have
promoted understanding of dream phenomenology. In parallel, brain lesion
studies, functional imaging and neurophysiology have advanced current
knowledge of the neural basis of dreaming. It is now possible to start
integrating these two strands of research to address fundamental questions
that dreams pose for cognitive neuroscience: how conscious experiences in
sleep relate to underlying brain activity; why the dreamer is largely
disconnected from the environment; and whether dreaming is more closely
related to mental imagery or to perception.
}}
-
@article{rees2008anatomy,
title={The anatomy of blindsight},
author={Rees, G.},
journal={Brain},
volume={131},
number={6},
pages={1414},
year={2008},
publisher={Oxford Univ Press}
}
- uhlhaas-roux-10_neural-synchrony-cortical-network-development.pdf
@article{uhlhaas-roux-10_neural-synchrony-cortical-network-development,
title={Neural synchrony and the development of cortical networks},
author={Uhlhaas, P.J. and Roux, F. and Rodriguez, E. and Rotarska-Jagiela, A. and Singer, W.},
journal={Trends in cognitive sciences},
year={2010},
publisher={Elsevier}
Volume 14, Issue 2, February 2010, Pages 72-80
}
- bullmore-sporns-2009nrev_complex-brain-networks.pdf
@article{bullmore-sporns-2009nrev_complex-brain-networks,
title={Complex brain networks: graph theoretical analysis of structural and functional systems},
author={Bullmore, E. and Sporns, O.},
journal={Nature Reviews Neuroscience},
volume={10},
number={3},
pages={186--198},
year={2009},
publisher={Nature Publishing Group}
}
- giudice2009plo.pdf
@article{giudice2009plo,
title={Programmed to learn? The ontogeny of mirror neurons},
author={Giudice, M.D. and Manera, V. and Keysers, C.},
journal={Developmental Science},
volume={12},
number={2},
pages={350--363},
year={2009},
marco.delgiudice@unito.it
ABSTRACT
Mirror neurons are increasingly recognized as a crucial substrate for many
developmental processes, including imitation and social learning. Although
there has been considerable progress in describing their function and
localization in the primate and adult human brain, we still know little about
their ontogeny. The idea that mirror neurons result from Hebbian learning
while the child observes/hears his/her own actions has received remarkable
empirical support in recent years. Here we add a new element to this
proposal, by suggesting that the infant's perceptual-motor system is
optimized to provide the brain with the correct input for Hebbian learning,
thus facilitating the association between the perception of actions and their
corresponding motor programs. We review evidence that infants (1) have a
marked visual preference for hands, (2) show cyclic movement patterns with a
frequency that could be in the optimal range for enhanced Hebbian learning,
and (3) show synchronized theta EEG (also known to favour synaptic Hebbian
learning) in mirror cortical areas during self-observation of grasping. These
conditions, taken together, would allow mirror neurons for manual actions to
develop quickly and reliably through experiential canalization. Our
hypothesis provides a plausible pathway for the emergence of mirror neurons
that integrates learning with genetic pre-programming, suggesting new avenues
for research on the link between synaptic processes and behaviour in
ontogeny.
}}
- bressler-menon-2010trics_large-scale-brain-networks.pdf
@article{bressler-menon-2010trics_large-scale-brain-networks,
title={Large-scale brain networks in cognition: emerging methods and principles},
author={Steven L. Bressler and Vinod Menon},
journal={Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
year={2010},
publisher={Elsevier}
pages = {277-290},
}
- bulloch-opfer-09_perceptual-to-relational-shift-in-generalization.pdf
@article{bulloch-opfer-09_perceptual-to-relational-shift-in-generalization,
title={What makes relational reasoning smart? Revisiting the perceptual-to-relational shift in the development of generalization},
author={Megan J. Bulloch and John E. Opfer},
journal={Developmental Science},
volume={12},
number={1},
pages={114--122},
year={2009},
opfer.7@osu.edu
ABSTRACT
Development of reasoning is often depicted as involving increasing use of
relational similarities and decreasing use of perceptual similarities ('the
perceptual-to-relational shift'). We argue that this shift is a special case
of a broader developmental trend: increasing sensitivity to the predictive
accuracy of different similarity types. To test this hypothesis, we asked
participants (3-, 4-, 5-year-olds and adults) to generalize novel information
on two types of problems – offspring problems, where relational matches yield
accurate generalizations, and prey problems, where perceptual matches yield
accurate generalizations. On offspring problems, we replicated prior findings
of increasing relational matches with age. However, we observed decreasing
relational matches on prey problems. Provided feedback on their responses,
3-year-olds showed the same trend. Findings suggest that the relational shift
commonly observed in categorization and analogical reasoning may reflect a
general increase in children's sensitivity to cue validity rather than an
overall preference to generalize over perceptual similarity.
A hallmark of human intelligence is the ability to generalize
flexibly over different types of similarity (Gentner,
2003). Two types of similarity are clearly important:
perceptual similarity, degree of overlap in perceptual features; and
relational similarity, degree of overlap in
common roles (Medin, Goldstone & Gentner, 1993). In
some situations, generalizing over
features of individual entities
is important. For example, given the relation
between fins and ocean living, the fact that dolphins and
swordfish both have fins suggests that they, unlike bears,
live in the ocean. Sometimes different patterns of generalization
are warranted, based on relations among different entities. For example,
given the relation between
mammals and nursing, the fact that both dolphins and
bears are mammals suggests that they, unlike swordfish,
nurse their young. Although generalization by either
type of similarity alone has been found in animals and
human infants (Marcus, Vinjayan, Bandi Rao & Vishton,
1999; Hauser, Weiss & Marcus, 2002; Shepard, 1987;
but see Cohen, 2003; Thompson & Oden, 2000), whether
children can ignore perceptual similarities and generalize
over opposing relational similarities is at the heart of
a lively debate in cognitive development (Gelman,
2003; Gentner & Toupin, 1986; Goswami, 1992; Opfer
& Bulloch, 2007; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004).
Evidence from category-based induction, where children’s
categories often map onto shared taxonomic,
functional, and social relations more closely than onto
perceptual similarities, indicates that young children can
generalize over common relations rather than just common
features (Brown & Kane, 1988; Goswami, 1995;
Opfer & Siegler, 2004; Springer, 2001). For example, 5-
year-olds generalized properties to a bat-like bird from a
flamingo (same relation, different features) rather than
from a bat (different relation, similar features) (Gelman
& Markman, 1986). On the other hand, reports of children’s
early ability to ignore perceptual similarity have
also been challenged. Preschoolers’ apparent use of
taxonomic relations in categorization might be explained
instead as reflecting differential weighting of exemplar
features (Jones & Smith, 1993), or stemming from
feature–feature correlations (McClelland & Rogers, 2003;
Rakison, 2000; Rakison & Hahn, 2004), or even from
preschoolers’ treatment of taxonomic labels as perceptual
features (Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004).
Evidence regarding the development of children’s
analogies has invited a similar debate. While there is
widespread agreement that toddlers can make analogies
as early as they represent relevant relations (Gentner
& Rattermann, 1991; Goswami, 1996), it is unclear
whether generalization over irrelevant perceptual similarities
is a necessary step in the development of analogical
reasoning (Rattermann & Gentner, 1998) or merely
a performance factor (Goswami, 1996). This issue is
important because the idea that children’s generalization
undergoes a perceptual-to-relational shift has had a long
tradition in developmental psychology (e.g. Vygotsky,
1962; Quine, 1977; Keil, 1989; Keil & Batterman, 1984;
Gentner, 1988, 2003; Ratterman & Gentner, 1989), and
although accounts differ in claims about domainspecificity,
the notion that perceptual matching is the
initial default in children’s reasoning (Keil’s ‘Original
Sim’) is widely shared.
In this paper, we propose an alternative perspective on the roles of
perceptual and relational similarity in the development of
generalization. Rather than development proceeding from generalizations over
perceptual similarities to generalizations over relational similarities
(Figure 1a), the dominant developmental pattern is towards generalizing over
highly predictive similarities, regardless of whether the similarities are
perceptual or relational (Figure 1b). Within this latter view, the important
developmental question is not when children learn to ignore irrelevant
perceptual similarities in favor of relational ones, but how children learn
the contexts in which they should ignore irrelevant perceptual similarities
and irrelevant relational similarities. Moreover, if our account is correct,
it has interesting implications for problems where perceptual and relational
similarities conflict. Specifically, it predicts increasing use of relational
matches with age for relations that reliably predict novel properties and
decreasing use of relational matches with age for relations that do not
reliably predict novel properties.
}}
==== GENERAL COGNITION ====
pyysiainen-2010trics_origins-of-religion">
- pyysiainen-2010trics_origins-of-religion.pdf
@article{pyysiainen-2010trics_origins-of-religion,
title={The origins of religion: evolved adaptation or by-product?},
author={Pyysi{\\"a}inen, Ilkka and Hauser, Marc},
journal={Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
year={2010},
publisher={Elsevier}
pages={104-109},
abstract = {
Considerable debate has surrounded the question of the origins and evolution
of religion. One proposal views religion as an adaptation for cooperation,
whereas an alternative proposal views religion as a by-product of evolved,
non-religious, cognitive functions. We critically evaluate each approach,
explore the link between religion and morality in particular, and argue that
recent empirical work in moral psychology provides stronger support for the
by-product approach. Specifically, despite differences in religious
background, individuals show no difference in the pattern of their moral
judgments for unfamiliar moral scenarios. These findings suggest that
religion evolved from pre-existing cognitive functions, but that it may then
have been subject to selection, creating an adaptively designed system for
solving the problem of cooperation.
}}
- baillargeon_2010trics_false-belief-understanding.pdf
@article{baillargeon_2010trics_false-belief-understanding,
title={False-belief understanding in infants},
author={Renée Baillargeon and Rose M. Scott and Zijing He},
journal={Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
year={2010},
publisher={Elsevier}
pages= {110-118},
abstract = {
At what age can children attribute false beliefs to others? Traditionally,
investigations into this question have used elicited-response tasks in which
children are asked a direct question about an agent's false belief. Results
from these tasks indicate that the ability to attribute false beliefs does
not emerge until about age 4. However, recent investigations using
spontaneous-response tasks suggest that this ability is present much
earlier. Here we review results from various spontaneous-response tasks that
suggest that infants in the second year of life can already attribute false
beliefs about location and identity as well as false perceptions. We also
consider alternative interpretations that have been offered for these
results, and discuss why elicited-response tasks are particularly difficult
for young children.
}}
- fiser-2009_optimal-perception-and-learning.pdf
@article{fiser-2009_optimal-perception-and-learning,
author={József Fiser and Pietro Berkes and Gergő Orbán and Máté Lengyel},
title = {Statistically optimal perception and learning: from behavior to neural representations},
pages= {119-130},
abstract = {
We review evidence for statistically optimal learning in humans and animals,
and re-evaluate possible neural representations of uncertainty based on their
potential to support statistically optimal learning. We propose that
spontaneous activity can have a functional role in such representations
leading to a new, sampling-based, framework of how the cortex represents
information and uncertainty.
}}
- xuFei-2007_sortal-concepts-objects-language.pdf
@article{xuFei-2007_sortal-concepts-objects-language,
title={Sortal concepts, object individuation, and language},
author={Fei Xu},
journal={Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
volume={11},
number={9},
pages={400--406},
year={2007},
publisher={Elsevier}
annote = {
This review highlights how the philosophical notion of a ‘sortal’ – a concept
that provides principles of individuation and principles of identity – has
been introduced into cognitive developmental psychology. Although the notion
‘sortal’ originated in metaphysics, importing it into the cognitive sciences
has bridged a gap between philosophical and psychological discussions of
concepts and has generated a fruitful and productive research enterprise. As
I review here, the sortal concept has inspired several lines of empirical
work in the past decade, including the study of object individuation; object
identification; the relationship between language and acquisition of kind
concepts; the representational capacities of non-human primates; object-based
attention and cognitive architecture; and the relationship between kind
concepts and individual concepts.
}}
- goldstein-edelman-2010trics_principles-of-space-time-learning.pdf
@article{goldstein-edelman-2010trics_principles-of-space-time-learning,
title={General cognitive principles for learning structure in time and space},
author={Michael H. Goldstein and Heidi R. Waterfall and Arnon Lotem and Joseph Y. Halpern and Jennifer A. Schwade and Luca Onnis and Shimon Edelman},
journal={Trends in cognitive sciences},
year={2010},
publisher={Elsevier}
pages = {249-258},
}
- gil-gahr-2010cell_honesty-of-bird-song.pdf
@article{gil-gahr-2010cell_honesty-of-bird-song,
Diego Gil and Manfred Gahr
The honesty of bird song: multiple constraints for multiple traits
annote = {
birdsong is an honest signal, since it requires considerable resources in
terms of brain structures, but also because social factors, such as learning
opportunity etc. [ rather like humans and social factors in education? ]
The function of bird song is closely linked to sexual selection. A fundamental
question regarding the evolution of sexually selected male signals is how their
honesty is maintained. The neural space required for storing a large song
repertoire size has traditionally been identified as a key constraint. However,
it is often forgotten that bird song is a multifaceted behaviour, and that the
different characters that comprise it have specific costs. Recent research has
revealed the existence of new constraints, such as social aggression or learning
opportunities, which limit the expression of several song characteristics. We
review the existing evidence for each of these constraints, revealing some
major gaps in our knowledge of this fascinating biological system.
}}
- dewaal-2010trics_bottom-up-animal-human-cognition.pdf
@article{dewaal-2010trics_bottom-up-animal-human-cognition,
title={Towards a bottom-up perspective on animal and human cognition},
author={de Waal, Frans B.M. and Pier Francesco Ferrari}
journal={Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
year={2010},
publisher={Elsevier}
pages= {201-207},
}
- curtis-lee-2010trics_persistent-activity-in-decision-making.pdf
@article{curtis-lee-2010trics_persistent-activity-in-decision-making,
title={Beyond working memory: the role of persistent activity in decision making},
author={Clayton E. Curtis and Daeyeol Lee},
journal={Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
year={2010},
publisher={Elsevier}
pages= {216-222},
}
- schyns-09_info-processing-algos-in-brain.pdf
@article{schyns-09_info-processing-algos-in-brain,
title={Information processing algorithms in the brain},
author={Schyns, P.G. and Gosselin, F. and Smith, M.L.},
journal={Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
volume={13},
number={1},
pages={20--26},
year={2009},
publisher={Elsevier}
}
- griffiths-chater-tenenbaum-2010trics_probabilistic-cognition.pdf
@article{griffiths-chater-tenenbaum-2010trics_probabilistic-cognition,
title = "Probabilistic models of cognition: exploring representations and inductive biases",
journal = "Trends in Cognitive Sciences",
volume = "14",
number = "8",
pages = "357 - 364",
year = "2010",
note = "",
issn = "1364-6613",
doi = "DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2010.05.004",
url = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VH9-50C8DJH-1/2/9cd535e6ea05607617e6c88da610f61f",
author = "Thomas L. Griffiths and Nick Chater and Charles Kemp and Amy Perfors and Joshua B. Tenenbaum",
abstract = "
Cognitive science aims to reverse-engineer the mind, and many of the engineering challenges the mind faces involve induction. The probabilistic approach to modeling cognition begins by identifying ideal solutions to these inductive problems. Mental processes are then modeled using algorithms for approximating these solutions, and neural processes are viewed as mechanisms for implementing these algorithms, with the result being a top-down analysis of cognition starting with the function of cognitive processes. Typical connectionist models, by contrast, follow a bottom-up approach, beginning with a characterization of neural mechanisms and exploring what macro-level functional phenomena might emerge. We argue that the top-down approach yields greater flexibility for exploring the representations and inductive biases that underlie human cognition."
}}
- mcclelland-botvinnick-smith-2010trics_letting-structure-emerge.pdf
@article{mcclelland-botvinnick-smith-2010trics_letting-structure-emerge,
Title = "Letting structure emerge: connectionist and dynamical
systems approaches to cognition",
journal = "Trends in Cognitive Sciences",
volume = "14",
number = "8",
pages = "348 - 356",
year = "2010",
issn = "1364-6613",
doi = "DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2010.06.002",
author = "James L. McClelland and Matthew M. Botvinick and David
C. Noelle and David C. Plaut and Timothy T. Rogers and Mark
S. Seidenberg and Linda B. Smith",
abstract = "Connectionist and dynamical systems approaches explain
human thought, language and behavior in terms of the
emergent consequences of a large number of simple
noncognitive processes. We view the entities that serve as
the basis for structured probabilistic approaches as
abstractions that are occasionally useful but often
misleading: they have no real basis in the actual processes
that give rise to linguistic and cognitive abilities or to
the development of these abilities. Although structured
probabilistic approaches can be useful in determining what
would be optimal under certain assumptions, we propose that
connectionist, dynamical systems, and related approaches,
which focus on explaining the mechanisms that give rise to
cognition, will be essential in achieving a full
understanding of cognition and development."
}}
- Please find file (try google scholar)
@
A computational foundation for cognitive development: comment on Griffths et al. and McLelland et al.
Alison Gopnik, Henry M. Wellman, Susan A. Gelman and Andrew N. Meltzoff
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Volume 14, Issue 8, August 2010, Pages 342-343
UC-Berkeley/UMich/UWash
A deep theoretical tension lies at the heart of developmental cognitive
science. Children – even infants – have abstract structured representations
of the world: intuitive theories and grammars, conceptual hierarchies and
phonological maps. At the same time, children learn. They transform their
representations based on concrete experiences – the contingent probabilistic
evidence of their senses. How can children induce abstract structure from
concrete contingencies?
Connectionist and dynamic theories, such as those advocated by McLelland et
al. [1], allow for learning but deny that there are abstract
representations. Traditionally the alternative has been nativism, which
allows for representation but denies that there is substantive
learning. Empirically minded developmental psychologists like us have been
dissatisfied with both of these options. Instead, we have advocated the
‘theory theory’ – the idea that children's learning is like theory change in
science – because in science we also see both rich structure and significant
learning [2] and [3]. However, until recently there were no computational
accounts of theory change.
When connectionist theories appeared, we were initially excited. But because
even infants have abstract representations of the world, computational
accounts that eschewed such representations were missing a crucial
component. By contrast, the framework of probabilistic models described by
Griffiths et al. [4] promises a computationally precise developmental
cognitive science that can integrate structure and learning.
The central advance has been to formulate structured representations, such as
causal graphical models, that can be easily combined with probabilistic
learning, such as Bayesian inference. Classically, we ‘theory theorists’
proposed that children learn by constructing hypotheses and testing them
against evidence. But if this is a deterministic process, then the ‘poverty
of the stimulus’ problem becomes acute – there will never be enough data to
definitively prove that one hypothesis is right and reject the rest. By
contrast, we would now propose that the child is a probabilistic learner,
weighing the evidence to strengthen or reduce support for one hypothesis over
another. Probabilistic models can help to explain how children are gradually
able to revise their initial theories in favor of better ones. Moreover,
recent evidence shows that young children do indeed behave like probabilistic
learners – entertaining multiple hypotheses, weighing new possibilities
against prior beliefs, experimenting and explaining – rather than simply
using associationist mechanisms to match patterns in the data, as in
connectionist systems.
The ultimate test of any perspective is whether it generates new and
interesting empirical research. Researchers inspired by the probabilistic
model approach have already begun to make important developmental discoveries
that do not fit the connectionist picture(for general reviews of
developmental theory and data see [5] and [6]). Recent work we have been
involved in has shown that 20-month-old children can infer a person's desire
from a non-random sampling pattern [7], 2-year-olds make better inferences
from causal cues than simple correlations [8] and 4-year-olds need only a few
data points to infer a new causal structure to explain anomalous evidence [9]
and to discover abstract causal rules [10]. Sobel's laboratory has shown that
infants can make causal inferences that go beyond association
(http://www.cog.brown.edu/research/causalitylab/); Schulz's has shown that
4-year-olds discover new abstract variables, experiment to resolve confounded
causes and weigh new evidence against prior knowledge
(http://web.mit.edu/eccl/).
Developmental evidence has also inspired computational
advances. Developmentalists emphasize the importance of framework theories,
explanation and experimentation and social context; computationalists are
starting to tackle those problems, too (e.g. http://www.mit.edu/ndg/,
http://louisville.edu/psychology/shafto/people/patrick-shafto.html,
http://artsci.wustl.edu/feberhar/). Collaboration between cognitive
development and probabilistic modeling holds great promise for the generation
of a more precise developmental theory and a more realistic computational
one, and an explanation, at last, of how children learn.
References
1 J.L. McLelland et al., Letting structure emerge: connectionist and dynamical systems approaches to cognition, Trends Cogn. Sci. 14 (2010), pp. 348–356.
2 A. Gopnik and A.N. Meltzoff, Words, Thoughts and Theories, MIT Press (1996).
3 S. Gelman and H. Wellman, Cognitive development: foundational theories of core domains, Annu. Rev. Psychol. 43 (1992), pp. 337–375.
4 T.L. Griffiths et al., Probabilistic models of cognition: exploring representations and inductive biases, Trends Cogn. Sci. 14 (2010), pp. 357–364. Article | PDF (351 K)
5 A. Gopnik et al., A theory of causal learning in children: causal maps and Bayes nets, Psychol. Rev. 111 (2004), pp. 3–32. Abstract | Full Text via CrossRef | View Record in Scopus | Cited By in Scopus (148)
6 In: A. Gopnik and L. Schulz, Editors, Causal Learning: Philosophy, Psychology and Computation, Oxford University Press (2007).
7 Kushnir, T. et al. Young children use statistical sampling to infer the preferences of others. Psychol. Sci. (in press).
8 E. Bonawitz et al., Just do it? Investigating the gap between prediction and action in toddlers’ causal inferences, Cognition 115 (2010), pp. 104–117. Article | PDF (276 K) | View Record in Scopus | Cited By in Scopus (0)
9 C. Legare et al., Inconsistency with prior knowledge triggers children's causal explanatory reasoning, Child Dev. 81 (2010), pp. 929–944. Full Text via CrossRef | View Record in Scopus | Cited By in Scopus (0)
10 Lucas, C. et al. Developmental differences in learning the form of causal relationships. In Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society (Ohlsson, S. and Catrambone, R., eds), Lawrence Erlbaum Associates (in press).
}}
- kello-2010trics_scaling-laws-in-cognitive-science.pdf
@article{kello-2010trics_scaling-laws-in-cognitive-science,
title={Scaling laws in cognitive sciences},
author={Christopher T. Kello and Gordon D.A. Brown and Ramon
Ferrer-i-Cancho and John G. Holden and Klaus Linkenkaer-Hansen and Theo
Rhodes and van Orden, Guy C. },
journal={Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
year={2010},
publisher={Elsevier}
pages ={223-232},
annote =
Scaling laws are ubiquitous in nature, and they pervade neural, behavioral
and linguistic activities. A scaling law suggests the existence of processes
or patterns that are repeated across scales of analysis. Although the
variables that express a scaling law can vary from one type of activity to
the next, the recurrence of scaling laws across so many different systems has
prompted a search for unifying principles. In biological systems, scaling
laws can reflect adaptive processes of various types and are often linked to
complex systems poised near critical points. The same is true for perception,
memory, language and other cognitive phenomena. Findings of scaling laws in
cognitive science are indicative of scaling invariance in cognitive
mechanisms and multiplicative interactions among interdependent components of
cognition.
}}
- klingberg-2010trics_plasticity-working-memory.pdf
@article{klingberg-2010trics_plasticity-working-memory ,
title={Training and plasticity of working memory},
author={Klingberg, T.},
journal={Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
year={2010},
publisher={Elsevier}
}
- teufel-fletcher-2010_other-minds-influence-perception.pdf
@article{teufel-fletcher-2010_other-minds-influence-perception,
title = "Seeing other minds: attributed mental states influence
perception",
journal = "Trends in Cognitive Sciences",
volume = "14",
number = "8",
pages = "376 - 382",
year = "2010",
note = "",
issn = "1364-6613",
doi = "DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2010.05.005",
url =
"http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VH9-50CVH9F-1/2/6b35710db61b4ab256617ed8a4389393",
author = "Christoph Teufel and Paul C. Fletcher and Greg Davis",
abstract = " A current consensus views social perception as a bottom-up
process in which the human brain uses social signals to
make inferences about another's mental state. Here we
propose that, contrary to this model, even the most basic
perceptual processing of a social stimulus and closely
associated automatic responses are modulated by
mental-state attribution. We suggest that social perception
is subserved by an interactive bidirectional relationship
between the neural mechanisms supporting basic sensory
processing of social information and the theory-of-mind
system. Consequently, processing of a social stimulus
cannot be divorced from its representation in terms of
mental states. This hypothesis has far-reaching
implications for our understanding of both the healthy
social brain and characteristic social failures in
psychopathology."
}
- schier-09_phenomenal-consciousness.pdf
@article{schier-09_phenomenal-consciousness,
title={Identifying phenomenal consciousness},
author={Schier, E.},
journal={Consciousness and cognition},
volume={18},
number={1},
pages={216--222},
year={2009},
publisher={Elsevier}
annote =
phenomenal consciousness is the subjective process of sensation = qualia.
access consciousness is what we are aware of, what we can verbalize. - AM
ABSTRACT:
This paper examines the possibility of finding evidence that phenomenal consciousness is
independent of access. The suggestion reviewed is that we should look for isomorphisms
between phenomenal and neural activation spaces. It is argued that the fact that phenomenal
spaces are mapped via verbal report is no problem for this methodology. The fact that
activation and phenomenal space are mapped via different means does not mean that they
cannot be identified. The paper finishes by examining how data addressing this theoretical
question could be obtained.
}}
- kouider-2010trics_partial-consciousness.pdf
@article{kouider-2010trics_partial-consciousness,
title={How rich is consciousness? The partial awareness hypothesis},
author={Kouider, S. and de Gardelle, V. and Sackur, J. and Dupoux, E.},
journal={Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
year={2010},
publisher={Elsevier}
Current theories of consciousness posit a dissociation between ‘phenomenal’
consciousness (rich) and ‘access’ consciousness (limited). Here, we argue
that the empirical evidence for phenomenal consciousness without access is
equivocal, resulting either from a confusion between phenomenal and
unconscious contents, or from an impression of phenomenally rich experiences
arising from illusory contents. We propose a refined account of access that
relies on a hierarchy of representational levels and on the notion of partial
awareness, whereby lower and higher levels are accessed
independently. Reframing of the issue of dissociable forms of consciousness
into dissociable levels of access provides a more parsimonious account of the
existing evidence. In addition, the rich phenomenology illusion can be
studied and described in terms of testable cognitive mechanisms.
--One or two types of consciousness?--
[Consciousness] research field now offers functional descriptions and
testable predictions regarding conscious processing [3], [4], [5], [6] and
[7]. However, critics of this approach to consciousness argue that functional
explanations come at the price of sacrificing the phenomenal aspects of
consciousness: functional explanations are restricted to the cognitive
mechanisms (i.e. attention, working memory, etc.) underlying access to
conscious contents, ignoring the problem of how these contents arise in the
first place [8] and [9]. From this perspective, consciousness should be
dissociated into two components, namely access and phenomenal consciousness,
following a popular dichotomy introduced by Block [9]. Importantly, the
contents of phenomenal experiences are assumed to be much richer than the
limited representations we can access at a given time
}}
- purwins-herrera-08_computational-models-of-music-cognition.pdf
@article{purwins-herrera-08_computational-models-of-music-cognition,
title={Computational models of music perception and cognition I: The perceptual and cognitive processing chain},
author={Purwins, H. and Herrera, P. and Grachten, M. and Hazan, A. and Marxer, R. and Serra, X.},
journal={Physics of Life Reviews},
volume={5},
number={3},
pages={151--168},
year={2008},
publisher={Elsevier}
annote = {
ABSTRACT
We present a review on perception and cognition models designed for or
applicable to music. An emphasis is put on computational implementations. We
include findings from different disciplines: neuroscience, psychology,
cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and musicology. The article
summarizes the methodology that these disciplines use to approach the
phenomena of music understanding, the localization of musical processes in
the brain, and the flow of cognitive operations involved in turning physical
signals into musical symbols, going from the transducers to the memory
systems of the brain. We discuss formal models developed to emulate, explain
and predict phenomena involved in early auditory processing, pitch
processing, grouping, source separation, and music structure computation. We
cover generic computational architectures of attention, memory, and
expectation that can be instantiated and tuned to deal with specific musical
phenomena. Criteria for the evaluation of such models are presented and
discussed. Thereby, we lay out the general framework that provides the basis
for the discussion of domain-specific music models in Part II.
}}
- baronchelli-10_colour-term-naming.pdf
@article{baronchelli-10_colour-term-naming,
title={Modeling the emergence of universality in color naming patterns},
author={Baronchelli, A. and Gong, T. and Puglisi, A. and Loreto, V.},
journal={Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
volume={107},
number={6},
pages={2403},
year={2010},
publisher={National Acad Sciences}
annote = {
simulates populations of language users and how they model colour terms, and
tries to duplicate the results of a large scale survey across human
languages, that certain colours, like a core red, are a-culturally preferred
as prototypical.
ABSTRACT
The empirical evidence that human color categorization exhibits some
universal patterns beyond superficial discrepancies across different cultures
is a major breakthrough in cognitive science. As observed in the World Color
Survey (WCS), indeed, any two groups of individuals develop quite different
categorization patterns, but some universal properties can be identified by a
statistical analysis over a large number of populations. Here, we reproduce
the WCS in a numerical model in which different populations develop
independently their own categorization systems by playing elementary language
games.We find that a simple perceptual constraint shared by all humans,
namely the human Just Noticeable Difference (JND), is sufficient to trigger
the emergence of universal patterns that unconstrained cultural interaction
fails to produce. We test the results of our experiment against real data by
performing the same statistical analysis proposed to quantify the universal
tendencies shown in the WCS [Kay P & Regier T. (2003)
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 100: 9085-9089], and obtain an excellent
quantitative agreement. This work confirms that synthetic modeling has
nowadays reached the maturity to contribute significantly to the ongoing
debate in cognitive science.
}}
- couzin-09trics_collective-cognition-swarms.pdf
@article{couzin-09trics_collective-cognition-swarms,
title={Collective cognition in animal groups},
author={Couzin, I.D.},
journal={Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
volume={13},
number={1},
pages={36--43},
year={2009},
publisher={Elsevier}
annote = {
The remarkable collective action of organisms such as swarming ants,
schooling fish and flocking birds has long captivated the attention of
artists, naturalists, philosophers and scientists. Despite a long history of
scientific investigation, only now are we beginning to decipher the
relationship between individuals and group-level properties. This
interdisciplinary effort is beginning to reveal the underlying principles of
collective decision-making in animal groups, demonstrating how social
interactions, individual state, environmental modification and processes of
informational amplification and decay can all play a part in tuning adaptive
response. It is proposed that important commonalities exist with the
understanding of neuronal processes and that much could be learned by
considering collective animal behavior in the framework of cognitive science.
}}
--- TRiCS
Towards a neural basis of music-evoked emotions
Pages 131-137
Stefan Koelsch
What determines our navigational abilities?
Pages 138-146
Thomas Wolbers, Mary Hegarty