

Hierarchy Theorems

- We now see that given strictly more resources (eg. time, space, nondeterminism) TMs can solve strictly more problems.
- A common feature in the proofs is diagonalization.

Theorem 1: If $g(n) = \omega(f(n) \cdot \log f(n))$ then $D_{\text{time}}(f(n)) \subsetneq D_{\text{time}}(g(n))$.

Proof:

- Let us design a TM, in the RHS, that is different from each one in the LHS.
- Consider the TM D : On input x ,
 - (1) If x is not a TM description then output 0.
(M_x is the TM described by x)
 - (2) Else simulate $M_x(x)$ for $g(|x|)$ steps:

(2.1) If it doesn't halt then output 0.

(2.2) Else output $1 - M_x(x)$.

• By definition, D decides a language $L \in D_{\text{time}}(g(n))$.

• Is $L \in D_{\text{time}}(f(n))$? Suppose yes.
Let M be a TM deciding L in time $c \cdot f(n)$, for all $n \geq n_0$.

(c & n_0 are some constants)

• Pick a "large" string y describing M
s.t. $g(|y|) > d \cdot f(|y|) \cdot \log f(|y|)$, for $|y| \geq n_0$.

(where d is the constant s.t. the "universal"
TM simulates $M_y(y)$ in time $d \cdot f(|y|) \cdot \log f(|y|)$.)

• What is $D(y)$?

• Note that $M_y(y) = M(y)$ runs for time $c \cdot f(|y|)$ & halts.

• Thus, D halts on y , in time
 $d \cdot f(|y|) \cdot \log f(|y|) < g(|y|)$, and
outputs $1 - M(y)$.

• This contradicts that M decides L !
 $\Rightarrow M$ does not exist.
 $\Rightarrow D_{\text{time}}(f(n)) \not\subseteq D_{\text{time}}(g(n)). \quad \square$

Space hierarchy

Defn: Space $(f(n)) := \{L \mid L \text{ is decided by a TM that use } O(f(n)) \text{ space}\}.$

Theorem 2: If $g(n) = \omega(f(n))$ then
 $\text{Space}(f(n)) \not\subseteq \text{Space}(g(n)).$

Proof:

- Again, we define a TM D as before.
- Further, note that the universal TM can simulate $M_y(y)$ in roughly the same space

as is the space-complexity of the TM y . \square

Open! A result as strong as Thm 2 for the time hierarchy?

ND Time hierarchy

- The proof of nondeterministic time hierarchy is quite involved.
- The issue is negation: For an NDTM M , we do not know whether the computation $1 - M(x)$ can be done by a "fast" NDTM.

Theorem 3: If $g(n) = \omega(f(n))$ then $N_{time}(f(n)) \subsetneq N_{time}(g(n))$.

Proof: • The idea is to design a TM D , in the RHS, that differs with the LHS very rarely. (no, negation requires few nondet. bits.)
This is called lazy diagonalization.

• For this purpose we need a very rapidly growing function $\delta: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ s.t. $g(\delta(i+1)) \geq \delta(i+1) \geq 2^{g(\delta(i)+1)}$, for all $i \in \mathbb{N}$.

• Consider the NDTM D : On input x ,
(1) If $x \notin 1^*$, then output 0.

M_i is the NDTM described by i
(2) If $(x = 1^n \ \& \ \delta(i) < n < \delta(i+1))$ then simulate $M_i(1^{n+1})$ for $g(n)$ steps.

(3) If $(x = 1^n \ \& \ n = \delta(i+1))$ then output 1 iff $M_i(1^{1+\delta(i)})$ rejects in $g(1+\delta(i))$ steps.

• Clearly, D is an NDTM with time

Complexity (for $n = s(i+1)$) being:

$$2^{g(s(i)+1)} \leq s(i+1) \leq g(s(i+1)) = g(n).$$

$\Rightarrow D$ decides a language $L \in \text{NTIME}(g(n))$.

• Say, an NDTM M decides L in time $f(n) = o(g(n))$.

Pick a "large" j s.t. $M = M_j$.

• By the definition of D (step-(2)):

$$\forall n \in (s(j), s(j+1)), D(1^n) = M_j(1^{n+1}).$$

\Rightarrow

$$\forall n \in (s(j), s(j+1)), M_j(1^n) = M_j(1^{n+1}).$$

\Rightarrow

$$M_j(1^{s(j)+1}) = M_j(1^{s(j+1)}) = D(1^{s(j+1)}).$$

• But by step-(3) of D :

$$D(1^{s(j+1)}) \neq M_j(1^{s(j)+1}).$$