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The May 1967 rebellion in the twin villages of Naxalbari and Phansidewa of Darjeeling district, still reverberates across India. The rebellion was organized by a small breakaway faction of the CPI(M) [Communist Party of India (Marxist)], but the party, which was in power then, expelled these radicals, and they went on to become the CPI(ML).

On June 28, 1967, Radio Peking called it "Spring Thunder over India":

A peal of spring thunder has crashed over the land of India. Revolutionary peasants in Darjeeling area have risen in rebellion. Under the leadership of a revolutionary group of the Indian Communist Party, a red area of rural revolutionary armed struggle has been established in India..... The Chinese people joyfully applaud this revolutionary storm of the Indian peasants in the Darjeeling area as do all the Marxist-Leninists and revolutionary people of the world.

While a large number of books have been written on the movement, this
volume, written by a police officer active in suppressing the movement,
presents a number of important documents that would be otherwise difficult
to get.  These include Home Ministry reports and police records, as well as
eight interrogation reports for arrested leaders, which give valuable
personal perspectives.  These constitute an important contribution to this
history, in terms of primary documents about the movement.  They are
presented, of course with the slant of an administrator.

This volume was published after several decades in 2007, but the documents
were collected much earlier.  Perhaps Mukherjee chose not to publish it
while retribution from ex-Naxals was more likely.

A tall white-haired gentleman of 55 was brutally murdered by the Naxalites near his house... the severed head was put on a thali and from the oozing blood, a young Naxalite girl decorated her own hands feet and forehead

Had this been a movement in some western nation, hordes of scholars would have pored over the primary sources and brought out realms of analysis. However, this is one of the few books we have that has some documentation from the period.

The introduction by Mukherjee is factual, and presents the situation well, though at times he is disparaging about the Naxal excesses.

Excerpts

from 'Spring Thunder' to 'Prairie Fire'?

			[Introductory Remarks by the author, ex. SP,
			 Darjeeling District, 1967]

When I went to Darjeeling as the District's Superintendent of Police
in July 1965, one could never imagine that a rather obscure part of
this district was destined to become eponymous with a new brand
of radical politics in India, giving birth to a series of militant agitations
and activities now known as the Naxalite movement or Naxalism.

[After the suppression of the initial Naxalbari movement in 1967]

Charu Majumdar was literally shattered by the turn of events...  His 'armed
revolution' (someone called it a fantasy) disintegrated in less than six
months following the commencement of his extremist and adventurist
enterprise and that too in his home ground.

This gasping old rebel was provided the much needed 'oxygen' by a group of
CPI(M) dissidents in Calcutta, first through the formation of the 'Naxalbari
0 Krishak Sangram Sahayak Samiti' (NOKSS), followed by the All-India
Co-ordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR) during 1968-
69. Charubabu hardly knew these CPI(M) dissidents even of West Bengal
closely enough, not to speak of the leading dissidents of other
States. Sushital Ray Chaudury and Saroj Dutta were two of the notable
dissident stalwarts in West Bengal but both of them were largely engaged in
the work of publication of the party mouthpiece.  None of them had any firm
and identifiable base because they were not known to have been leading party
organisers in the field. Asit Sen, Parimal Dasgupta, Parimal Sengupta and a
few others were among the field-level workers and organisers but their forte
was in trade union and other mass movements, which was anathema to
Charubabu.

However, all of them were in a state of confusion and disarray, especially
since 1966-67 when the CPI(M) not only decided to take active part in the
Assembly elections but, buoyed by their victory, decided to join the first
United Front Government of West Bengal in March 1967. The dissidents in the
CPI(M) were, therefore, desperately looking for a way out and thought that
the 'path of Naxalbari' was the answer. Initial posturings by the Communist
Party of China (CPC) on 3 July, 1967 that the Naxalbari upsurge was like a
'spring thunder over India' suddenly bolstered the sagging morale not only
of Charubabu but of the other dissidents in Kolkata and elsewhere.

The CPC leaders, however, did not take long to realise that.their reading of
not only the Indian situation but also of the 'chief stoker' of the prairie
fire, namely, Charu Majumdar, was grossly erroneous.  But by then the shots
had been fired by the CPI(M) ultras with the formation of the CPI(ML) on 22
April 1969 [Lenin's birthday].

Soon thereafter, the mass-based leaders were either thrown out or they
walked out when they realised that their utility vis-a-vis Charubabu was
no longer there. Even Asit Sen who presided over the Kolkata Maidan public
meeting of 1st May 1969 where the formation of the CPI(ML) was announced,
was the first casualty, followed in quick succession by Parimal Dasgupta
and many others who had provided the initial foothold for Charubabu in the
Kolkata milieu, a totally alien territory for him.

However, Charu Majumdar acted quite fast, ably aided by Sushital Ray
Choudhury and Saroj Dutta of the old guard and Prof. Suniti Ghosh of
relatively recent vintage, to consolidate his position with the formation of
the All India Co-ordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR)
and the creation of a new party called ·the Communist Party of India
(Marxist-Leninist) with Charu Majumdar at the centre stage.  His position
was further strengthened in the Party Congress held in Kolkata (15-16 March
1970) where an unsuccesful attempt was made, with obvious blessings from
him, to have him declared as the 'revolutionary authority' in India. But
this did not prevent him from following his natural urge for a shortcut to
Mao's 'protracted struggle'.

It is generally known that power corrupts. But it is quite unusual that the
very 'thought' of power may also have a dangerously corrosive effect on
certain persons. How else does one explain the fact that when his own
edifice was showing palpable cracks, Charu Majumdar could 'assure'
Pakistan's chief of its Eastern Command in East Pakistan
(Lt. Gen. A.A.K.Niazi) that in case of their attack on India, the West
Bengal Naxalites under his leadership would 'join hands' with them? This is
what Niazi wrote to Gen. Hamid (chief of Pak Army) in June 1971, requesting
permission to attack India 'in pursuit of Mukti Bahini', before India could
launch its attack: " ....  We are in touch with Mr. Lam Danga (sic), leader
of the Mezo (sic) freedom fighters, Mr. A.Z.Phizo, leader of the Naga
freedom fighters in Assam(?) and Charu Mauzumdor (sic), leader of the
Naxalites of West Bengal. They will join hands with us ... "
[This contradicts the testimony of Souren Bose, who suggests
that Charu M was not adopting the Chinese stance adequately.]

The rest of the Naxalite story is too well-known - open encouragement of
desecration of statues of national leaders, attacks on schools, colleges,
libraries and laboratories in the cities and towns since May-June 1970 when
the youths could not be 'suitably integrated with rural peasantry' nor could
they be kept back and fully 'utilised' in the villages.
Thus in West Bengal, 1257 such instances of vandalism took place, mostly
during May-July 1970, of which 376 were in Kolkata alone; some instances of
this have been incorporated in this publication. Simultaneously, Charu M
kept on urging the young cadres to form 'secret and conspiratorial' groups
for 'annihilation of class enemies' in a most brutal and senseless
manner. Even Che Guevara or Carlos Marighella (proponent of the urban
guerrilla operations) could not have done better.

One look at Mazumdar's booklet titled A few words on guerrilla action.
(April 1970) will reveal the depth of depravity into which the youths were
being consigned:

	The Guerrilla Band should be formed in complete secrecy ....
	The method of forming these bands is conspiratorial ...
	The conspiracy should be on personal and individual basis.  The
	intellectual comrades should take the initiative in this matter
	.... (who) should approach the poor peasants with required
	potentials and whisper 'Won't it be good to liquidate such and such
	jotedar' ....
	For this .... we should start by liquidating local 'Class enemies' ....
	The guerrilla band should be small, compact and mobile ....
	each band should be limited to the maximum of seven. Normally the
	qualifying test of a guerrilla band will be their capability in
	handling ordinary weapons in killing one or two persons in sudden
	raids ....
	Hatred against a particular 'class enemy' should be fomented ....
	The guerrillas should move in from different directions pretending
	to be harmless people, meet at a pre-selected place, wait for the
	enemy and as soon as the opportunity arises jump on the
	enemy and liquidate him ....

Naxalites in Calcutta

Kolkata and its suburbs had the harrowing experience of witnessing the
handiwork of many such murder maniacs created through the above booklet and
many other writings in the CPI(ML) mouth-pieces Deshabrati (edited by
Saroj Dutta) and Liberation (edited initially by Sushital Roy Choudhuri
and later by Suniti Ghosh).  Deshabrati in particular used to whip up the
murder mania by presenting distorted and gory accounts of the 'heroic deeds'
of such Action Squads ('guerrilla bands' in Charu M's words), thereby
creating a dangerous competition among the action squads in regard to
their 'success rate' (i.e. number of murders committed).  A number of
youths belonging to such squads confessed to police about this trend. p.13

This emphasis on brutal killing had another damaging fallout, namely,
'propensity to induct criminal and anti-social elements into action squads
to 'ensure better score'. There is no reason to think that the top CPI(ML)
leaders were unaware of this trend. On the contrary, they prescribed a
facile 'solution'. In a number of articles in the party organs and also
through letters to field commanders, it was being suggested that 'greater
emphasis should be laid to impart political education for such elements'.
... Incidentally, most such elements were either illiterate or
semi-literate, the usual specimens of the underworld lumpens of Kolkata and
other urban pockets. It was no surprise, therefore, that a large number of
such elements could be arrested by police since many of them were not
totally unknown to police stations and the Detective Department (DD)
officers, leading to further arrests with the assistance of such characters.

Who were the 'class enemies' thus annihilated?  Mostly policemen to start
with, followed by CPI(M) cadres and others.  Such victims in Calcutta alone
during 1970 were 17 policemen and 2 Home Guards + 9 CPI(M) cadres + 16
others - a total of 44.  In 1971 the murdered persons included 16 policemen
and 3 Home Guards + 34 CPI(M) cadres +57 others -  a total of 110. The
number of people annihilated as class enemies in West Bengal till the end
of 1975 was 287 in Kolkata, 73 in Burdwan district, 6 in Bankura, 8 in
Purulia, 77 in Midnapore, 151 in Birbhum, 147 in 24-Parganas, 28 in Howrah,
27 in Hooghly, 91 in Nadia, 33 in Murshidabad, 9 in West Dinajpur, 26 in
Darjeeling, 35 in Jalpaiguri and 6 in Cooch Behar.

The murdered 'class enemies' also included such eminent and respected
personalities like Justice K.L.Roy of Calcutta High Court (for allegedly
refusing to pay the substantially jacked up ransom amount) and Prof. Gopai
Sen, Vice Chancellor of Jadavpur University (for objecting to the University
hostels being utilised for sheltering known criminals and anti-socials.).

Power struggles : Naxalites killing each other

The above annihilation figures include Naxalites killed by Naxalites, the
the inevitable spiral of blood-thirst.  Police reports: 3 in 1971 and 1 in
1972; but later documents and interrogation of Naxalites including Asim
Chatterjee, Souren Bose, Sadhan Sarkar, Shyamal Ghosh and even of Charu
Majumdar besides many others revealed many more 'liquidations' of Naxalites
by Naxalites, some of which were alleged to have been carried out at the
behest of the top leaders.  In a letter to Charu M, Asim Chatterjee
alleged (and also in his statement to police after arrest), that one of
his trusted comrades named 'Chandi' (real name was Sudhir Chandra Nag) was
murdered in Dhanbad under 'suspicious circumstances' when Asim had fallen
out with CM; Asim received no reply from CM, and strongly suspected that
CM had engineered this murder. 15-16

In his last letter dt. 7.5.72 to Charu Majumdar, Suniti Ghosh,
(pen-name Soumya), an old associate of CM, expressed grave apprehension
about his own 'liquidation' as a result of dangerous inner-party feud
and urged CM to stop this suicidal game. He also charged the
leadership (by implication CM) for causing the annihilation of South
Calcutta Regional Committee Secretary (Kamal Sanyal) and RC
Member (Agni Roy) after falsely labelling them as 'police informers'
and alleged that some rumours were being spread that he (Suniti)
too was a 'police spy'.

Sunitibabu further stated in this letter that "The 'tit-for-tat' struggle
has started within the party itself; those who have killed the comrades,
especially those who have had them killed, have put a noose round the neck
of the party. As the days pass, the noose is sitting tight and unless you
take early steps to remedy the situation, it will finish the party."
Sunitibabu then reminded CM about the murder of Chandi (Asim Chatterjee's
associate) of Dhanbad and the report of two members of the leading team of
Bihar to the effect that Dilip (Dilip Banerjee, a close confidant of CM) had
incited this murder and that "A programme of elimination of Asim's
supporters in Nadia was reported to you (CM) by a leading comrade of
Nadia. At that time Dilip was keeping contact with some Nadia comrades, and
within a few days that boy (who had earlier reported to CM about the
programme of annihilation of Asim's supporters in Nadia) himself became a
martyr in 'police firing'...  Such brutal killings of comrades is
unmistakably pointing to one thing: this sort of crime is the ultimate and
irresistible result of a left-adventurist and left-opportunist line."

Along with that letter, Suniti Ghosh enclosed a copy of his letter to Dilip
Banerjee in which he virtually charged the latter for his responsibility in
the killings of Kamal, Agni, Chandi and the Nadia comrade. He also accused
Dilip of 'breaking all norms of party discipline by carrying on an organised
slander campaign' against Kanu Sanyal and Suniti Ghosh, thereby laying the
blames for all such 'misdeeds' and 'crimes' squarely at the door of CM. One
can imagine the level of total isolation of CM and his resultant desperation
in relying on Dilip as his hatchet man.

Two other documents recovered during CM's arrest speak of murder of party
comrades Panchu and Ramen (both of Port Regional Committee?) in April 1972,
after an initial attempt to portray these killings by police, just as it
was done in the case of Kamal and Agni.  Even Souren Bose, one of CM's most
trusted comrades for years, admitted that at least two comrades got murdered
for refusing to follow CM's authority blindly. 

Brutal murders

In this context, we may make special mention about a few ghastly
incidents. Shri Gorachand Sanyal, an extremely dignified and ex-INA
officer who was then an Inspector of Security Control of
Calcutta Police had been living in the Baranagar area for decades.
When Baranagar-Cossipore became the favourite killing-fields of the
Naxalites he was strongly advised by his senior officers to shift
himself at least for some months to a 'safer' area. But he politely
declined to do so on the ground that he was like a loving grandfather
or uncle to most of the young boys and girls of the area, and as such
there was no cause for concern about him.

This tall, fair-complexioned and white-haired gentleman of nearly 55 years
was brutally murdered by the Naxalites close to his house on 27 July 1971
and beheaded thereafter; the severed head was put on a thali and from the
oozing blood, a young Naxalite girl decorated her own hands feet and
forehead in full public view! 

I wonder if such young persons could develop into normal human beings in
later life.

Home Ministry (GoI) report on Naxalite movement Apr'71 to Mar'72

In 1971, Pakistan ruthlessly suppressed the national liberation movement in
East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).  China's unabashed alignment with the Pak
military regime discomfitted many Bengalis.  The movement was divided on
whether to go with China on this or not.

[Naxal Violence]:

from an analysis of the figures:

(i) West Bengal accounted for the largest number of incidents (91 %)
    followed by Bihar (4.3%), Punjab (1.7%) and Andhra Pradesh (1.5%).

(ii) The proportion of heinous offences like murder and dacoity rose during
    the year under review to 26.6% of the total number of incidents as
    against 12.9% during the preceding year, whereas petty incidents like
    attacks on national symbols and hoisting of red flags registered a steep
    fall from 653 during 1970-71 to 98 during 1971-72.

(iii) Policemen formed an important target of extremist violence and 88 of
    them were killed during 1971-72, as compared to 75 during
    1970-71. Sneak murders of policemen, however, went down during the
    latter part of the period following strong criticism of this programme
    and only 2 policemen have been killed in the first quarter of 1972.

Split in CPI(ML)

(Inner-party) differences, which first surfaced at the Party Congress in May
1970, went on growing due to policy differences and personality
clashes. Charu Majumdar's leadership of the movement came under increasing
criticism during the year on the following counts:

(i) Charu Majumdar was trying to don the mantle of an Indian Mao and
    converting the party into an instrument of self-glorification.  He had
    subverted the functioning of the party organs and disregarded the advice
    provided by the Chinese Communist Party.
(ii) He was completely ignoring the need for creating bases in the
    countryside for waging a protracted people's war and was instead
    encouraging adventurist violence in urban areas by inadequately
    politicised elements.
(iii) Charu Majumdar was defying Mao's theory that a people's democratic
    revolution should precede a socialist revolution and trying to
    intertwine the two unsuccessfully by scorning the role of the national
    bourgeoisie and the middle peasantry at the present early stage of the
    revolution. 
(iv) Charu Majumdar's view that guerrilla struggle was the only form of class
    struggle was wrong, and it was necessary to coordinate the armed
    struggle with other forms of struggle. The party should have also
    organised mass movements on economic and other issues.
(v) The emphasis laid by Charu Majumdar on self-sacrifice (for the sake of
    implementing his adventurist programme) rather than on self-defence had
    resulted in the loss of many valuable cadres.

The opposition to Charu Majumdar's policies, led initially in 1970 by the
Andhra Party, was spearheaded in 1971 by late Sushital Ray Choudhury of West
Bengal, Shiv Kumar Mishra of UP and Satya Narain Singh of Bihar. In May
1971, Asim Chatterjee, a prominent organiser of West Bengal and Bihar areas,
also parted company with Charu Majumdar.


Hare Krishna Konar

Besides having other differences, Asim Chatterjee accused Charu Majumdar of
indulging in 'mean and vile centrism' on the Bangladesh issue by not
following China's policy of supporting the Yahya regime. The dissidents
formalised and split by constituting a new Central Committee in
November·l971, electing Satya Narain Singh as the General Secretary, and
expelling Charu Majumdar and Suniti Ghosh from the party. This break-away
group has since started publishing its own 'Liberation' and
'Deshabrati'. China's disapproval of Charu Majumdar's policies and its
implicit support to Satya Narain Singh's group have now become quite clear.

---

Hare Krishna Konar [CPI(M)] said before he became a Minister that land
reforms cannot be achieved unless there is a change in the present set up
of administration.

But when he became a Minister of the Govt. of West Bengal, he had forgotten
those remarks and had to work under the ·present set up of admimstration
dictated by the bourgeois and big landlords of the country. - Kanu Sanyal
statement, p.192

statement of Souren Bose

On 18th August 1970 I attended a meeting of the leading members of the
State Committee at the residence of Shibangsu Mukharji in North
Calcutta. The meeting which continued till 10 pm was attended by Charu
Majumdar, Sushital Roy Choudhuri, Saroj Dutta, Suniti Ghosh and myself.

In this meeting Sushital Roy Choudhuri (SRC) first raised some differences
about the management of Deshabrati paper and the actions in the city. 
He pointed out that for the last four months he was not being consulted
about the publication of some items of news and articles in Deshabrati
though he was the Editorin- Chief.  CM and Saroj Dutta pointed out that
sometimes it might have happened but this should not recur.

SRC also pointed out that in a particular issue his name as the
Editor-in-Chief was not printed.  He expressed his displeasure over this
and viewed that there had been a tendency to ignore him; CM replied that
there was no such intention.

Besides, SRC also wanted to have clarification on the following points :
	1. City movement/actions.
	2. Students' movement/actions.
	3. Damaging statues of national leaders.

As regards city movements and students' movements, SRC thought that the
party should take up urgent and immediate demands to rouse the people with
the students behind the party. 

He added that it seemed to him that the present actions in the city were
rather isolating the party from the general masses. As regards the damage
of the statues of national leaders, he thought that the party should assess
properly before damaging the statues of the personalities like Rabindranath
etc. CM did not agree on this, expressed that detailed discussion was not
possible in this meeting and asked SRC to submit a written version of his
opinion which would be circulated amongst the party-cadres for opinion.
SRC agreed to this and observed that it seemed to him that he was holding
views different from those of the other leaders present.
p.209-10

While I was abroad, some of the members of the CC met somewhere in Central
India (probably near Delhi) during Sept '70.  That was a partial meeting of
the CC. Charu Majumdar, Saroj Dutta, Shiv Kumar Misra and Satyanarain Singh
attended the meeting. At that meeting, Satyanarain Singh placed a document
of difference with C M. The differences were on the following points :

   1. The party programme was not being properly followed by CM.
   2. The city movements were not correctly led.
   3. Attitude towards the rich peasants was not correct
   4. As the main political trend in the world now is the trend of
	revolution, in India we must try to achieve maximum unity against US
	Imperialism. So, the struggle should be planned in such a way that
	this unity is not hampered.

It was decided that Satyanarain Singh would place the document before the
CC which would circulate the same among different units along with a note
from CM. p.213

in the early stage there was controversy over the definition of
class-enemy. A question arose whether police would be treated as class
enemy. This controversy was resolved with the consensus that police did not
fall in the category of class-enemy.  This controversy was raised in the
party on the issue of resisting police repression in some areas of West
Bengal and Bihar.  It was discussed that though police force was acting on
the orders of the reactionary State power, the members of the police force
do not come in the category of exploiting class.  Officially, the party had
no decision either at CC level or SC level to annihilate policemen.  There
was, however a general understanding from the very beginning that when the
secrecy of the organisation was at stake through leakage by police agents,
care should be taken against them. p.213

Souren Bose is sent to London and Peking

On 18th August, 1970 the leaders of the State Committee (CM, Souren Bose,
Prof. Suniti Ghosh, Sadhan Sarkar, SRC and Saroj Dutta) met at the
residence of Shibangsu Mukharji where SRC paid me a sum of Rs. 10,000/-
(all GP notes in Rs. 100/- and Rs. 10/- denominations) for the expense
towards my journey. SRC also gave me three letters of introduction - one
addressed to the General Secretary, Albanian Party of Labour, the second to
the Member-in-Charge of the Central Committee of the CPC and the last one
to the Secretary General of the CPB(ML).

Bill Ash, Vice-Chairman of the CPGB(ML), Ranjana Ash, Mr. Taylor, Chairman
of the Communist Party of New Zealand and Mr. Rezberg, Chairman of the
CPGB(ML) at the office ofthe CPGB(ML) at 25 Eden Street, Central London.

Critique of Charu Majumdar agenda

They strongly criticised CM's dictum that "One who has not smeared his
hands with the blood of a class enemy is not fit to be called a communist"
(CM's Few words regarding guerrilla actions, published in Bengali by
Deshabrati Prakashani, Calcutta in April1970).  They said that this cannot
be a Marxist norm. 230

[Bose talks to Chou-en-Iai and Kang-Sheng, the two topmost CPC leaders in
Peking on 29 Oct. 1970].
On certain points Chou-en-Lai was even more emphatic than the CPGB(ML)
leaders.  For example, he (and Kang-Sheng) strongly denounced the CPI(ML)
slogan "China's Chairman is our Chairman" and Charu Majumdar's dictum that
"one who has not smeared his hands red with the blood of the class enemy is
not fit to be called a 'communist'."  Chou mentioned that most of them,
even their Chairman Mao could not be called a 'communist' according to
such' a dictum and that was obviously absurd and "totally unacceptable as
the norm for a communist." p.230

[Bose's report of the conversation with Chou finally split the party into
pro-Charu and anti-Charu factions. 
	- Sumit Mitra, India Today  March 12, 2014]

from Charu Majumdar's statement

[died of cardiac complications while in custody, on Jul 27, 1972] p.289

In 1940 July I left Congress, went to Jalpaiguri and joined the Krishak
Sabha (CPI) as an ordinary worker. It was then the last stage of
"Share-Croppers' Movement" organised by the Krishak Sabha in Jalpaiguri,
Rangpur and Dinajpur. With the arrest of the leaders of the movement under
the newly passed DI Rule, the ShareCropper movement fizzled out. I was also
then served with orders under the DIR but I evaded arrested and went
underground. The peasants suffered a setback and were averse to taking any
revolutionary step. 290

During my college days, I became addicted to drinks and consumed liquor
regularly at the college hostel. I used to get Rs. 25/ per month from my
father of which I used to spend Rs. 6/- as college fees, Rs. 7/- as hostel
charges and the rest Rs. 12/- for wine. At later stages, I also became
addicted to Ganja, Bhang, Opium, Charas and Siddhi which I continued for
long.

In 1946, the CPI organised Food Movement where the party had hold.  In my
place of activity (i.e. Jalpaiguri) I led the movement and
seized crops from the stores of the jotedars.  We demanded two-third of the
crops for the peasants and one-third for the jotedars. 

The movement spread in Jalpaiguri to a great extent and continued till the
partition in 1947. In this Tebhaga Andolan, 60 peasants lost their
lives. 291

With the partition, the centre of our activities, i.e. Boda, Pachagar
and Debiganj went to Pakistan. We withdrew ourselves from those
areas and concentrated in Dooars area (in Jalpaiguri district) of Indian
Union. In March 1948 the party (CPI) was banned and its leaders
were arrested. I was also arrested from Jalpaiguri under the
DIR (Defence of India Rules) and was detained in Dum Dum Central
Jail till 1951 January.

while in Dum Dum Jail in December 1959 [?1949?], I picked up Kanu Sanyal,
who also was jailed for launching a demonstration against the then Chief
Minister of West Bengal Dr. B.  C. Roy at Siliguri. Kanu Sanyal was also a
resident of Siliguri.  His family was known to me but I was not so much
thick and thin with Kanu.  In jail our acquaintance grew deeper. After his
release, he went back to Siliguri with my instruction(?) to work amongst
the peasantry. Kanu Sanyal was not then a member of the CPI but a
supporter. 292

However, after I was stationed at Siliguri in June 1952, I revived my
connections with Kanu Sanyal and with him organised small movements with
the village peasantry in the nature of "Tebhaga Andolan". These movements
did not spread well. This continued till the end of 1953. During these
movements I came in contact with Jangal Santhal and Babulal Biswakarma who
were then peasants and just youths. Souren Bose, who was then a member of
the Darjeeling D. C., also took part in these movements.

In 1959 the party's attention was once again drawn to the peasants
front when the State Committee gave a call for capturing benami
lands from the jotedars and Zamindars who, taking advantages of
certain loopholes in the Zamindary Abolition Act, 1954 had transferred
lands or had acquired benami.lands. It was a statewide programme.
Harekrishna Konar, then an SC member, called the programme •leftsectarian'
and virtually the call did not receive wide implementation
at the hands of the Krishak Sabha, entrusted with the task of
implementing the programme. I undertook some work in this respect
in Naxalbari and its adjoining areas. The whole programme practically
flopped though I was able to capture some benami lands and distribute
the same amongst the landless local peasants.

Naxalbari movement

In March 1967, when the UF Government was installed in West Bengal, the
peasants of Naxalbari rose in revolt.. I was in the background. It was Kanu
Sanyal assisted by Souren Bose, Dipak Biswas and Jangal Santhal who led the
struggle. Out of about 27000 peasants in the area, 500 took active part
while about 20000 helped them.  In this upsurge the peasants snatched arms
from the jotedars and big landlords. There were arson and lootings but very
few jotedars or landlords were killed in this struggle. On the contrary, we
suffered heavily in the hands ofthe police. The UF Government ordered police
action and the struggle subsided for the time being. 294

We selected Naxalbari and Phansidewa as the sites of launching struggle on
account of the following reasons :
(1) We had sufficient hold amongst the peasants and tea garden workers of
    the area.
(2) Those peasants and tea garden workers had sustained grievances for
    continued oppression.
(3) The area also had the advantages of its geographical location.

Out of the above three reasons, the first one was the guiding force behind
the struggle.

During this period all of us were connected with the Darjeeling District
Committee of the CPI(M). In September 1967 myself, Souren Bose and others
were expelled from the CPI(M).

I forgot to mention one thing that while the Naxalbari movement was in
progress, Biswanath Mukharji (CPI), then in the UF Government in West
Bengal (Irrigation Minister), saw me at my house in Siliguri on behalf of
the Government and requested me to give up the struggle.  By the by he
mentioned that they were also after this type of revolution but not at that
stage. I regretted that I could not give up the struggle. This would go on,
I asserted. 294

While I continued staying at home, most of my colleagues including Souren
Bose and others went underground. It was probably after November 1967, some
of my CPM colleagues in Calcutta led by Sushital Roy Choudhuri, who were
also expelled from the CPI(M) as they shared views with us, formed a
committee styled "Naxalbari 0 Krishak Sangram Sahayak Samiti"(NOKSSS).
Though I cannot recollect the date of its formation, I believe it was formed
sometime in June/July 1967. This was formed in Calcutta.  295

This committee organised a rally on 11th November 1967 at the foot of the
Monument, Calcutta. I addressed the rally. The same morning (l1th November
'67) I arrived at Calcutta from Siliguri by plane and went straight
to the residence of Sushital Roy Choudhuri at Maniktola; I stayed there for
2-3 days when, on 12th & 13th November 1967 comrades of different States
met there and formed the "All India Co-ordination Committee of the
Communist Revolutionaries".(AICCCR).

So far as I remember, the following persons attended the two days' sitting:
Sew Kumar Misra and S.N.Tiwari of UP, Satyanarain Singh of Bihar IL. Appu
of Tamilnadu and Sushital Roy Choudhuri, Saroj Dutta, Charu Majumdar,
Parimal Dasgupta, Promode Sengupta, Kaliprosad Roy Chaudhuri, Prof. Suniti
Ghosh, Asit Sen, Shyamal Nandi (all of West Bengal) and a few others. p.295

Contents

'Spring Thunder' to 'Prairie Fire'?
Introductory observations

Part-I : The Naxalbari Movement (1967-1968)

Chapter 1: The Gathering Storm

   - Note of A.P. Mukherjee, Superintendent of Police,
	Darjeeling District submitted to the Cabinet Committee
	[June, 1967] 							39
   - Note of M. Bhattacharya, Deputy Commissioner, Darjeeling
	District submitted to the Cabinet Committee
	[June, 1967] 							54
   - Report of SP, Darjeeling dated 11 May, 1967 on
	Sannyasisthan Tea Estate disorders and on land-related
	issues 								60
   - Setting up of Sub-division and Thana Land Reforms
	Committees (5) in Darjeeling district under West Bengal
	Government Resolution of 21 June, 1967 				65
   - A comparative table on land-related cases of Rioting and
	Murder in the two rural sub-divisions of Siliguri
	[Darjeeling district] and Diamond Harbour [24-Parganas
	district] during 1960-1966 					71
   - West Bengal Government Cabinet decision of 5
	July, 1967 regarding 'Naxalbari troubles and
	guidelines for police operations' 				71
   - Socio-economic profiles and other details of the persons
	arrested during the Naxalbari movement[ 1967-68] based
	on their interrogation reports 					73

Chapter 2 : The Lessons of Naxalbari

An evaluation of the Naxalbari movement titled 'The Lessons of
    Naxalbari ', written during August-September, 1968, by
    A.P. Mukherjee as SP of Darjeeling District 			75

West Bengal Land & Land Revenue Minister Shri Harekrishna
    Konar's Note dated 5.3.1969 regarding the above manuscript
    which was submitted to the Government seeking permission
    for its publication and Govt. of west Bengal order dated
    11.3.1969 permitting its publication by the author 			130

Observations on the above manuscript by Shri Upananda Mukharji,
    JP, IP [Inspector General of Police, West Bengal] 			131

Postscript to "The Lessons of Naxalbari" : Arrest of
    Kanu Sanyal on 31 October, 1968 					132

Part-II: Naxalite activities esp. Calcutta (1969- 1972)

Chapter 3 : 'Peasant Revolutionaries' to 'Urban Guerrillas'--
			- Mao Tse-tung to Che Guevera?

  - Excerpts from an assessment report dated 6.3.1970 of the
	Deputy Inspector General of Police, Intelligence
	Branch, West Bengal on the Naxalite situation 			141
  - Excerpts from some of the assessment reports on the
	Naxalite situation by the Deputy Commissioner of
	Police, Special Branch, Calcutta 				146
  - Instances of resistance to Naxalite 'Actions' in
	educational institutions in and around Calcutta during
	July, 1970 							154
  - Socio-economic profiles and other details of arrested
	Naxalites (800) of West Bengal, based on their
	interrogation reports [I 969-1972] 155
  - Extracts from a Government of India review report on the
	Naxalite Movement in India [April 1971 to March 1972] 		156

Chapter 4 : Critiques of Charu Majumdar

		especially some of his writings and the CPI(ML)
		policies and programmes by leaders of the
		Chinese Communist .  Party and other fraternal
		parties (notably of UK and New Zealand) 		163

Chapter 5 : The Naxalite Leaders Speak for Themselves

Interrogation Brief 							169

Interrogation reports / Statements of prominent Naxalite leaders (8) :

1. Nisith Bhattacharji arrested 11.6.1970
	[Member, Calcutta District Committee] 				172
2. Nagbhusan Patnaik 24.7.1970
	[Member, Central Committee] 					183
3. Kanu Sanyal 19.8.1970
	[Member, Central Committee] 					188
4. Souren Bose 7.3.1971
	[Member, Politburo & Central Committee] 			193
5. Shyamal Kumar Ghosh 23.5.1971
	[Courier of important Politburo &
	Central Committee Members] 					241
6. Asim Chatterjee 3.11.1971
	[Member, Central Committee] 					258
7. Sadhan Sarkar 18.1.1972
	[Secretary, Calcutta District Committee
	and later Secretary, West Bengal State Committee] 		268
8. Charu Majumdar 16.7.1972 						288

Sumit Mitra: Naxalites: Revolution gone astray

May 31, 1979, India Today

[After] the judgement by the Andhra Pradesh High Court acquitting two
front-ranking leaders of the Naxalite movement, Kanu Sanyal, 53, and Souren
Bose, 55, of all charges in the now famous Parvatipuram Conspiracy Case ...
Sanyal and Bose received a hero's welcome outside the Alipore jail where they
had been detained.

Exactly 10 years ago, on May 1, 1969, Sanyal had announced the formation of
the Communist Party of India (Marxist Leninist) (CPI-ML) at a rally in
Calcutta. On the same day, Bengal Chief Minister Jyoti Basu, who was home
minister in the second United Front Government, was addressing another
rally. Basu branded "Sanyal, Mazumdar and company" as "partly political and
partly anti-social", and promised ruthless administrative measures against
them. But in the intervening 10 years Basu has had a change of heart and took
personal initiative in securing release of Naxalite leaders, Sanyal and Bose
among them.

Lengthy Trial: The Parvatipuram Conspiracy Case instituted in 1969 will go
down in history as the most important landmark in the trial of communists
after the Kanpur Conspiracy Case of 1923. Of the 140 people accused, 20 were
killed in allegedly fake encounters with police. Charu Mazumdar, an accused
and founding father of the Naxalbari movement died in custody on July 28,
1972. Sushital Roychowdhury, another accused and a prominent leader, died in
hiding. The others were sentenced for various terms including life
imprisonment.

Seventeen of the accused, all of whom had- been sentenced for life, made an
appeal before the Andhra Pradesh High Court in 1976. The hearing of the
appeal drifted from courtroom to courtroom and the years rolled by. Finally,
the hearing commenced on March 26 this year and the Andhra Pradesh Government
made a counter-appeal. The two appeals were referred to a five-judge division
bench and the hearing concluded on April 19. The judges rejected the state
Government's plea unanimously, and ordered acquittal of 11 of the 17
appellants. Sanyal and Bose were among them.

Requests from the ruling Left Front of West Bengal to withdraw the case were
turned down by the Chenna Reddy Government, and finally it was left to the
judiciary to settle the matter. It could hardly have been otherwise, since
withdrawal of the case could only have meant a negation of the Congress
approach towards political dissent.

Sanyal and Bose, who spent four years in Vizag Central Jail, in a secluded
enclosure guarded by electrified barbed-wire nets, moved into Alipore Central
Jail in Calcutta in 1976. The news of their acquittal was communicated to
them by their counsel on April 27.

Naxalite Uprising: Both Sanyal and Bose come from the bustling North Bengal
tea town of Siliguri. Together with Charu Mazumdar and Jangal Santhal, they
masterminded the Naxalbari uprising on March 3, 1967, a day after the CPI-M
to which they then belonged came to power for the first time in Bengal's
history as a constituent of the first United Front.

The peasant uprising of Naxalbari, which was promptly lauded by Peking Radio
("front paw of Indian revolution") and the People's Daily ("spring thunder
over India"), was soon suppressed by the United Front Government through an
unprecedented police mobilization. Leaders like Mazumdar, Sanyal, Bose and
Santhal were thrown out of the CPI-M, as a wave of expulsions gripped all
state units of the party, particularly in West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and
Kerala.

The first United Front Government fell in 1968, and all Naxalite leaders were
arrested during President's Rule. In 1969, the Leftists registered a
landslide victory, and set the Naxalites free immediately on assuming
office. But that in no way reduced the Naxalites' hostility towards the CPI-M
("neo-revisionists") and the CPI ("revisionists"). In subsequent years, at
least 1,700 CPI-M and Naxalite workers were killed in street clashes.

In 1970, Bose was sent to China by the CPI(ML) Central Committee to assess
the views of Chinese leaders about the Indian situation. In Peking, leaders
like Chou En-lai were bitterly critical of Charu Mazumdar's
leadership. Bose's report of the conversation with Chou finally split the
party into pro-Charu and anti-Charu factions.

IMPROVED RELATIONS: As for now, the coldness in relations of the late '60s
between the CPI-M and the Naxalites - or at least a section of them - has
given way to a positive warmth. Both Sanyal and Bose are apparently grateful
to the CPI-M for having taken keen interest in their release. Santhal, and
the mercurial student leader, Asim Chatterjee, against whom no cases were
pending outside the state, had been released earlier by the state
Government. They too are obviously indebted to Basu. 

However, different break away factions of the Naxalites are still maintaining
the earlier hostile stance toward the CPI-M. Many of them like the Vinod
Misra group, have not yet rejected their earlier theory of creating red bases
through individual murders. Others have given undertakings to the Central
Government that they will abjure violence. During the 10 years, the "spring
thunder" has virtually spent itself, and the "front paw" seems to have led
the Indian revolution nowhere.