

Short Vectors in Lattices

Lecturer: Manindra Agrawal

Scribe: Chandan Saha

November 25, 2005

1 Introduction

Definition 1.1 A lattice $\mathbf{L} \subseteq \mathbf{R}^n$ is a set of points defined as:

$$\mathbf{L} = \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i u_i \mid \alpha_i \in \mathbf{Z} \text{ and } u_i \in \mathbf{R}^n \right\}$$

We will assume that $m = n$ and u_i 's are linearly independent. The problem of computing a shortest vector in a given lattice is **NP-hard**. We define the volume of a lattice \mathbf{L} as:

$$\text{Vol}(\mathbf{L}) = | \det[u_1 \ u_2 \ \dots \ u_n] |$$

If the u_i 's are linearly dependent then $\text{Vol}(\mathbf{L}) = 0$. The vectors u_1, u_2, \dots, u_n are called a *basis* for \mathbf{L} .

Lemma 1.1 $\text{Vol}(\mathbf{L})$ is independent of the choice of the basis.

Proof: Let v_1, v_2, \dots, v_n be another basis for \mathbf{L} . We have, $v_j = \sum_{i=1}^n \beta_{ij} u_i$, where $\beta_{ij} \in \mathbf{Z}$.

$$\begin{aligned} [v_1 \ v_2 \ \dots \ v_n] &= [u_1 \ u_2 \ \dots \ u_n] \cdot [\beta_{ij}] \\ \Rightarrow | \det[v_1 \ v_2 \ \dots \ v_n] | &= | \det[u_1 \ u_2 \ \dots \ u_n] | \cdot | \det[\beta_{ij}] | \\ \Rightarrow | \det[u_1 \ u_2 \ \dots \ u_n] | &\text{ divides } | \det[v_1 \ v_2 \ \dots \ v_n] | \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, $| \det[v_1 \ v_2 \ \dots \ v_n] | \text{ divides } | \det[u_1 \ u_2 \ \dots \ u_n] |$.

Therefore, $| \det[v_1 \ v_2 \ \dots \ v_n] | = | \det[u_1 \ u_2 \ \dots \ u_n] |$. ■

2 Application of finding Short Vector in a Lattice

Consider the scenario where the RSA cryptosystem is used. Let p and q be two large primes and $n = pq$. Let $(n, 3)$ be the public key. Suppose we encrypt message m such that the initial part of m is a fixed header h that is known, whereas the unknown content of the message be x that is l bits long. Without loss in generality assume that $0 \leq m < n$.

Let $m = h \cdot 2^l + x$ and $c = m^3 \pmod{n}$. Assume that the adversary knows c, h, l and $(n, 3)$. Since,

$$\begin{aligned} c &= (h \cdot 2^l + x)^3 \pmod{n} \\ \Rightarrow p(x) &= x^3 + a_2x^2 + a_1x + (a_0 - c) = 0 \pmod{n} \end{aligned}$$

The adversary computes $p(x)$ and tries to solve for x . Let a lattice $\mathbf{L} \in \mathbf{R}^6$ be defined by the following basis vectors:

$$\begin{pmatrix} a_0 - c \\ a_1 \\ a_2 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ a_0 - c \\ a_1 \\ a_2 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ a_0 - c \\ a_1 \\ a_2 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} n \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ n \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ n \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

Therefore, $\text{Vol}(\mathbf{L}) = n^3$.

Theorem 2.1 (Minkowski) *Let $\mathbf{L} \in \mathbf{R}^d$ be a lattice. Then, the length of the shortest vector in $\mathbf{L} \leq d^{\frac{1}{2}} \cdot \text{Vol}(\mathbf{L})^{\frac{1}{d}}$.*

From the above theorem we conclude that the shortest vector in our lattice \mathbf{L} has length $\leq \sqrt{6}n^{\frac{1}{2}}$.

Let $v = (v_0, v_1, \dots, v_5)$ be the shortest vector in \mathbf{L} . Let the polynomial

$$\begin{aligned} v(x) &= \sum_{i=0}^5 v_i x^i \\ &= \gamma_1 p(x) + \gamma_2 x p(x) + \gamma_3 x^2 p(x) + \gamma_4 n + \gamma_5 n x + \gamma_6 n x^2 \\ &= (\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 x + \gamma_3 x^2) p(x) \pmod{n} \end{aligned}$$

Suppose $x = m_0$ be the unknown message. Then

$$\begin{aligned} p(m_0) &= 0 \pmod{n} \\ \Rightarrow v(m_0) &= 0 \pmod{n} \\ \Rightarrow m_0 &\text{ is a root of } v(x) \text{ modulo } n \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} |v(m_0)| &= \left| \sum_{i=0}^5 v_i m_0^i \right| \\ &\leq 6 \max\{|v_i|\} m_0^5 \\ &\leq 6 \max\{|v_i|\} 2^{5l} \\ &\leq 6\sqrt{6} \cdot \sqrt{n} \cdot 2^{5l} \\ &< n \text{ if } l < \frac{1}{10} \log \frac{n}{216} \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, $v(m_0) = 0$ over \mathbf{Z} . Thus if the actual message x is only about $\frac{1}{10}$ -th of the total message then the adversary can solve for x by computing a shortest vector v in \mathbf{L} and then solving for $v(x) = 0$ over \mathbf{Z} .