topics: |  india | politics |

The early years of Narendra Modi

I excerpt below from a chapter written by Ghanshyam Shah, one of India's leading political scientists. Shah's work has mainly focused on minority communities - Dalits, Muslims and tribals - and how their voices have been found only in insurrections. Shah is the author of Social Movements in India (2004), which analyzes nine different types of subaltern, class, religion and environmental movements. He is presently a National Fellow, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla.

However, over a long career as researcher and then director at the Center for Social Sciences in Surat, he has also been a close observer of Gujarat politics. This particular article, written well before Modi's arrival on the national stage, highlights his emphasis on image rather than content, reflected by the shrill reference in the title to the Nazi era propaganda guru, Goebbels. Despite this unsavoury bias in title, the main article is written in an objective and scholarly manner, and highlights the development of Modi as a political leader, quoting from both his supporters like Pravin Sheth, and his detractors such as the journalist Ajay Umat.

Modi's propaganda machine today (2015)

Incidentally, the propaganda chief working for Modi is a low-key Officer on Special Duty in the PMO by the name of Hiren Joshi. He manages the narendramodi.in portal, and manages his tweets and responses.

Joshi also runs a huge "cyber-army" of several thousand net-savvy
svolunteers who intervene in social media, re-tweet modi's tweets, and
oppose negative portrayals.  The amorphous group also includes senior
executives from companies like Pricewaterhouse Cooper and Deloitte 
who quit their corporate jobs to join Modi's team.    
After the 2015 elections, Modi sent out
letters to some 15 thousand such cyber volunteers.

As an example of their effectiveness, journalist Aakar Patel reported in 
liveMint (2013) that when he analyzed YouTube, he found 
that all the highly-watched videos of opponent leaders like Rahul Gandhi
were strongly negative - even where he is attacking the ordinance
protecting convicted politicians - whereas even banal videos of Modi have
many more likes than dislikes...  It is not easy to portray Modi negatively
in public fora like wikipedia.


The mainstream media campaign — TV, print and radio ads — is 
managed by Manoj Ladwa, 
who was a London-based mergers and acquisitions lawyer, before shifting to 
Delhi where he works out of a Lodhi Road office with creative inputs from
veteran advertising professionals such as Ogilvy & Mather's Piyush Pandey, 
the man behind the Rs.400 crore "Ab ki baar, modi sarkAr" campaign of 2014, 
along with others like Prasoon Joshi (McCann) and Sam Balsara (Madison). 


this chapter is also available at academia.edu

Excerpts : ch.8 Gujarat Elections : Ghanshyam Shah

Gujarat is the only state in India where the BJP has continuously
secured over 50 percent of the total seats in the last six Lok Sabha
elections. 

L.K. Advani was the hero in 1991. He led a Rath Yatra from Somnath to
Ayodhya. Following the yatra, he contested from Gujarat for the first time,
and thereafter continues to fight from Gandhinagar Parliament
constituency. 

To reduce “interference” from party workers, Modi leaned on government machinery. For him, bureaucrats were more dependable and obedient than party and Sangh Parivar activists...

But his position had changed in 2009 despite being the party’s prime ministerial candidature. He was not the charioteer in Gujarat. Narendra Modi was in full command. 20 years back, Modi was considered to be a protégé of Advani. He worked as an organizer for the Rath Yatra in 1989. This time while inaugurating the party’s Lok Sabha election campaign, Advani showered praises on Modi’s leadership and his “achievements in a relatively short time.”

Emergence of Modi

After the impressive victory in the 2007 Vidhan Sabha elections,
speculations floated in political circles that Modi was trying to carve out
a national role for himself.

In early 2008, hoardings appeared with a picture of Modi waving his arm along
with the slogan: “Maru swapana: Hariyalu Bharat” (My Dream: Green
India). Below the picture it stated that Compressed Natural Gas (CNG)
stations had been set up across Gujarat, indicating his dream to replicate
Gujarat in India.  

Later, in January 2009, several important business tycoons including Anil
Ambani, Sunil Mittal, and Ratan Tata hailed Modi as “the future prime
minister.”  Ambani said that the way he had transformed Gujarat, he could
change the complexion of the country. “[A] person like him should be the next
leader of the country,” Mittal asserted.  

BJP leaders like Arun Shourie and Jaitley also lauded him. A vernacular
newspaper stated in April: “Because of the pressure from RSS Advani expressed
his desire not to contest. Narendra Modi will fight elections from
Gandhinagar constituency for Lok Sabha.” 
[Gujarat Smachar, (Ahmedabad), April 1, 2009.]

“no repeat” theory in nominating candidates: meets the anti-incumbency factor, and prevents consolidation of power with any local leader.

More importantly, a majority of the BJP voters in Gujarat, according to the National Election Study (NES) carried out by CSDS, preferred Narendra Modi rather than Advani as the “the next Prime Minister of India” (see Table 8.3). Thus, it was a Modi focused elections in Gujarat. His spirit and confidence were very high and he expected to do better in the Lok Sabha polls than the December 2007 Assembly elections. This paper explores the possible reasons for the BJP’s victory from Gujarat, in reference to the earlier polls and especially the role of Narendra Modi. The survey data presented here is based on NES 2009 and 2007.

Modi’s Mission

Modi was the star campaigner of the BJP in the 2009 elections.  Among his
fans and the party cadre he enjoys an image of an expert in “personality
development and party image building.”

When he became the Chief Minister (CM) in October 2001 by ousting Keshubhai
Patel, he lacked a social base in Gujarat. At that time the party was in
disarray as it lost power in most of the local governments, and was also
defeated in two by-elections. After resuming office, he won elections from
Rajkot with a thin margin, a traditional stronghold of the party and
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). His strength increased after a few months
due to the emotive issue of Hindutva coupled with the large scale 2002
carnage.

Fear psychosis with a catchy question that he raised, “Apanu kon” (who is
ours — who will protect us?) inflamed emotions. He won Assembly elections
with a thumping majority.  But within 18 months, emotions began to
subside. The party’s performance in the 2004 elections in Gujarat was not as
good as the previous Vidhan Sabha and the 1999 Lok Sabha polls. The
Congress regained its support in the intensely riot 
affected constituencies. Moreover BJP lost power in the center.
[Ghanshyam Shah, “Gujarat after Godhra,” in Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace
(eds), India’s 2004 Elections: Grass-roots and National Perspectives (Delhi:
Sage Publications, 2007), pp. 151–79]
 

From the rhetoric of Hindutva to Development

By this time, as a shrewd politician committed to Hindutva politics, Modi
might have realized the constraints of the CM’s office to translate Hindutva
ideology into the democratic system.  Hindutva rhetoric of the 1990s had
diminishing return. RSS, Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), Bajrang Dal could be
effective in raising an emotional pitch but less useful to sustain people’s
support. 

To nurture Hindutva, “development” had to be embraced. It may be noted that
the BJP won power in Gujarat in 1995 not only with Hindutva plank but also
with a promise to establish “bhaya, bhukh, and bhastachar mukta” (free from
fear, hunger, and corruption) Gujarat. 

The ideologues — Golwalkar, Sudarshan, etal.— have repeatedly asserted that
the present era was the period of transformation based on Hindutva
philosophy.  Modi shares their faith that Hindutva would lead the world in
the 21st century.

Though the concept of Hindutva remains ambiguous, except the dominance of
Hindus, economic policy of the BJP has changed to be in tune with
capitalism. 
[Thomas Blom Hansen, “The Ethics of Hindutva and the spirit of Capitalism,” 1998]

His upbringing in the Shakha culture makes him a self styled moralist, with a
holier than thou syndrome. He seems to believe that most of the party members
were interested in goodies and personal power. Therefore they had to be under
surveillance for “good governance.”

He was determined “to run the organization in his own way, direction and
style.”
Like Sarsanchalak of RSS, his agenda was to have trusted and disciplined
loyalists.  Moreover, after winning the 2002 elections his increased
confidence led him to believe he could expand his base in civil society and
also directly relate with the people at large.

Removing interference from party workers

To reduce his dependence on and “interference” of the party workers, he
leaned on the government machinery. For him, the bureaucrats were more
dependable and obedient than the party and Sangh Parivar activists for
governance. In the process, he discarded dissenters and competitors.  

[This is a practice that has continued in recent years.  From a 2015 article
by Sankrant Sanu: 
	the inaccessibility of PM Narendra Modi has also been part of the
	cadres’ malaise ... People who have worked with Modi for decades also
	find his door closed.  He appears to have surrounded himself by a
	bureaucratic coterie, leading to additional disappointment from the
	cadre of “their man” being in power.  ]

Eventually BJP in Gujarat became synonymous with Modi: “BJP is Modi and Modi
is BJP.” (statement by millionaire candidate
Harin Pathak. Won in 2009 
but denied a seat in 2014. )

The state party president emphasized, “We have Narendra Modi, he is the
symbol of Gujarati asmita (pride) and he is our mascot. When you have a
leader like Modiji, why do you need anything else?”

Conquering Civil Society : Building his own image

During the 2002 [Godhra] carnage, a major and dominant segment of the
Gujarat civil society — journalists and columnists, litterateurs,
philanthropists, and social workers maintained more or less silence.
[Some] Samaritans without assigning responsibility for the violence, appealed
for peace and harmony.  “Muslims were taught a good lesson,” said the
Jnanpith award winning poet Rajendra Shah, . 
[10. Panna Naik, “Gujarat violence in literature,” paper presented at the
Association for Asian Studies (AAS) conference, San Diego, July 4, 2004.]

Most NGO activists also shared these beliefs. “We are concerned with our
‘constructive’ work; and we have to get grants from the government.”
[personal interviews]
Without taking a political position, a few NGOs got involved in providing
“relief” to the victims.

There were of course, isolated individuals who protested against the
carnage, and blamed the state for not controlling the situation and saving
the victims. Such voices were on the fringes of the civil society.

Pravin Sheth, Modi’s former teacher in Political Science informs us in 2002,
“Narendra Modi was extremely alert in order to build his own image.”
[Sheth Pravin, Images of Transformation: Gujarat and Narendra Modi
(Ahmedabad:  Team spirit, 2007), p. 60.]

An organizer at best and a manipulator at worst

At the time when he resumed office, his image among those who were close to
BJP was of an organizer at best and manipulator at worst.  He was “politically
exiled from the state in 1998,”[Sheth p.55/59] and was not allowed to dabble
with the affairs of the Gujarat BJP. Yet, he successfully orchestrated the
ousting of Keshubhai Patel and became the CM.  

A similar game was being played at the BJP’s Goa meeting, when Vajpayee
wanted Modi to resign after the 2002 mayhem.

During the 2002 communal pogrom and the subsequent elections, he repeatedly
talked about Hindutva, Hindu ethos, tolerance, and magnanimity of Hindus and
their glorious past. Simultaneously, he not only ridiculed Muslims as
“backward” but also accused them of an agenda to increase their population so
as to become a majority. 

According to him, Islam and Christianity are the “real roots” of terrorism in
India.  
[The Indian Express (Ahmedabad), November 5, 2008.]

Slogans

Like Sarsanchalak of RSS, his agenda was to have trusted and disciplined loyalists.

With such assertions and slogans, he established himself as the champion of Hindus. To reinforce the image, the public relations officer of the Government of Gujarat (GOG) projected him as a “God with a beard.” A senior journalist gave heading to his article on Modi, “woman likes strong husband and people like masculine leader.” [Gujarati article by Ajay Umat, “Swapna nu marketing karine Modi jiti shakae chhe" [Modi can win by marketing dreams],” Divya Bhaskar, (Ahmedabad), December 15, 2005.]

On the eve of the Assembly elections, Modi was portrayed as charioteer
Krishna, carrying Sudarshan Chakra, and guiding State Energy Minister
Saurbha Patel shown as Arjun. The sloka (stanza) “Yada Yada Hi Dharmasya”
was painted just above Modi, showing him as the savior of Dharma. 
[The Indian Express (Ahmedabad), August 30, 2007 ]

(The Indian Express contacted the poster maker in Amreli town, Vitthal
Bamrolia, who confirmed that he made it as per descriptions given by some
businessmen from Surat.)

Book of Poems (2007)

In April 2007, Modi’s collection of poems Aankh a Dhanya Chhe (Blessed
are these Eyes) was launched in Mumbai. The audience featured influential
literary personalities.

While launching the book, a well-known poet Suresh Dalal said, 
	Modi is a sensitive person belonging to the realm of heart and
	politics. One can see ‘kalpvriksha’ [blesses one with what is
	desired] in his one eye, and ‘saMkalpviksha’ [strong determination]
	in the other. And that yields him fruits of abundance and
	achievement. [Sheth Images of Transformation. p. 222.]

The 2002 election campaign was launched with “Gujarat Gaurva [honor]” yatra
(journey of pride in Gujarat), covering 5000 km throughout the state.

The starting point of the yatra was Phagvel, the holy place of Kshatriyas who
constitute a sizable majority in central Gujarat. The legend associated with
Phagvel is that over two centuries ago, a Hindu warrior, Bhatiji, had waged a
battle against Muslims to protect a herd of cows. Bhatiji, in whose memory a
temple had been built, is believed to have died fighting. The purpose of the
yatra, Modi said was to instill in the people of Gujarat pride and
self-confidence, which they lost after the sectarian violence.
[22. Tridip Suhrud, “Modi and Gujarati ‘Asmita’,” EPW, Vol. 43, No. 1,
 (January 5, 2008), pp. 11–13. See also the collection of 77 articles with]

In 2002, Modi coined a slogan, “Aapanu [our] Gujarat, Aagavu [distinct]
Gujarat.” Next year, 2003, Modi celebrated Gujarat foundation day as “Gaurav
Day.” Now, every year this celebration is being organized in different
cities.

Deflecting Godhra criticisms onto the minorities

Modi skillfully depicted all the criticisms against him for the carnage,
intolerance, anti-Muslim attitude, and injustice to victims as adverse
comments on the five crore population of Gujarat. He repeatedly accused his
critics, particularly non-Gujarati English speaking intelligentsia, as
“Gujarat haters” and jealous of Gujarat’s development. Chandrakant Bakshi
went to the extent to say that the English speaking intelligentsia at large
was the “Anti-Gujarat, Secular Taliban.”

Another writer, S.K. Modi says:

	What drives these English language men and women? Why do they enjoy
	putting down their own? Their own country. Their own society. What
	kind of complex are they suffering from? … The reporting by the
	English language media has been so full of bias, so vengeful towards
	the Hindu community and so full of hate for the Gujarati society at
	large.
		[Rita Kothari, “Diffusing Polarization: Language and
		Translation at the Time of the Gujarat Riots.”
		http://translate.eipcp.net/transversal/1107/kothari/en []

Harrassing dissenting voices

Dissidents of the civil society, a very tiny segment have very limited
space. Such columnists had been told by the proprietors of Gujarati
newspapers to be careful in writing against Modi. And if some were to write
critical comments, the editors used their authority not to publish
them. 

Dissident NGOs often experience harassment in their activities. A few of
them, particularly working among the Dalits and Adivasis were often asked to
prove their credential, especially that they were not involved in
conversion. 

Those in academic institutions, their work was under constant surveillance,
regarding what they write and say on public issues. [No citations given]

Eliminating intra-party debate

The 2009 election advertisement of BJP was: “No discussion, vikas
[development] is the mantra of BJP. Rastravad is BJP’s mahamantra.”  Even the
BJP MLAs were instructed what to ask and what not to ask in the state
assembly during the question hours.  

Intra-party debate had been eliminated. Bureaucrats were asked to follow
orders and not to raise queries.  

During the 70 months of his first tenure, there had been 2.5 days sitting per
month of the state Assembly, the lowest number in the history of Gujarat
Assembly. 
[Rahul Mangaonkar, “Narendra D Modi: D for Democracy or Dictator,”
Times of India, (Ahmedabad), August 4, 2007.]

No state Planning Board had been formed. Autonomy of the state funded
cultural and literary organizations had been considerably abridged.

Modi, as quoted in The Economic Times, April 23, 2008:
	Hindutva and development are not contradictory. How can Ram Rajya be
	anti-development? Ram Rajya is all about providing opportunity for
	those who need help. What should be on the nation’s top drawer is the
	resolve to redeem Gandhiji’s pledge to wipe out every tear from every
	eye.  And that is Ram Rajya. Only pseudo secularists argue that
	Hindutva and development cannot coexist. It only exposes their
	perverted thinking.  

Vibrant Gujarat and Jyotigram programs

In 2003, the Vibrant Gujarat global investor conference was organized with
lots of publicity to attract foreign investment. This has become a regular
feature every two years. Besides, transparent deals and no pending files, the
investors had been offered infrastructure facilities at cheap rates, and more
subsidiaries and tax holidays than earlier. Investments increased with many
more incentives, the development of Industrial Parks and Special Economic
Zones. 

Some industrialists stated that Gujarat was becoming a “truly world
class state.” They wanted Modi to be India’s PM. People were promised that
industrial growth would provide more employment and unlimited opportunities
to prosper. Middle class became jubilant.

Jyotigram Scheme introduced in the late 2004 was another effort to win
popular support in rural areas. Though 97 percent of the villages in
Gujarat were electrified by 2002, electric supply was erratic in some parts
of the state. Three-phase electricity declined from 18–20 hours in the 1980s
to 10–12 hours by the end of the 1990s. Hence, “power supply to agriculture
became the key issue in Gujarat’s mass politics.” During 2001–02, the
government was considering the proposal to gradually raise tariff and
regularize power supply. The state was then “in the midst of major power
sector restructuring exercise with a loan from the Asian Development Bank.”
Modi quickly not only endorsed the proposed scheme with certain changes but
saw its speedy implementation.

Rural households have been provided with 24 hours electric power for domestic
use and 8–10 hours for agriculture. While doing this, he also increased power
tariff, which was an unpopular step and opposed by a section of farmers. But
the decision also reinforced his image as a man of action and “good
governance” even though some small and marginal farmers and landless were
adversely affected. The scheme was indeed an “astute political management of
intervention in an arena surcharged with animated mass politics.” 

Failed Resurrection of the Saraswati River

In 2005, the government released water from the Narmada dam into the dry
Saraswati River in north Gujarat. He called it mahasangam (grand union) of
two holy rivers. More than a thousand sadhus were brought to the function at
state expense. 

The CM announced, “The resurrection of Sarswati will enrich the people of
region.”

But within a few months, “Narmada water … turned into a drainage line with
sewage and waste being dumped on the bed by the municipality.” 
[The Indian Express (Ahmedabad), June 19, 2007.]

The flow of water was discontinued because the municipality could not pay
Rs. 50 lakh per month for the pumping of the water.

Election Organization and Strategy

The final say on the selection of the BJP’s candidates for all elections in
the state from panchayats to parliament was with Narendra Modi.  After a
setback in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections and rising opposition in the party,
he concentrated on municipal elections to wipe out inner party opposition. 

He began with a “no repeat” theory in nominating candidates to meet the
anti-incumbency factor, and also to prevent consolidation of power with any
local leader. He cultivated direct rapport with people and told party workers
that he would not tolerate anyone who is “inefficient” and “non-loyal.” In
the inaugural election campaign in Gondal Municipal elections, Modi told the
people:

	I am not here to beg your votes for the election but I have come here
	to express my apologies. Five years back you trusted the BJP and
	elected us with thumping majority. But we have failed to meet your
	expectations.  I know that our sitting councilors have made this
	place hell. You have all rights to punish us in this election. I have
	dropped them and have not given ticket. But now you have to pardon
	BJP and give one chance to us. 

“No repeat” theory with a few exceptions was applied to all the seven
municipal corporation elections. People were told that those who had not
worked for them were punished by the party and a new team was offered. 

The strategy had an electric effect. The BJP won all of the Municipal
Corporations with absolute majority. In the State Assembly elections, 43
percent of the sitting MLAs were given tickets. All of them were his
loyalists. For the Parliament, out of 16 sitting BJP MPs, three were
repeated—Advani, Hiren Pathak, former Minister and Rajendra Sinh Rana, former
BJP State president. 
[Ajay Umat, “No repeat theory vaprine Modi ae bulldozer fervyou [Modi
bulldozed by uasing no-repeat theory], Diyva Bhaskar, December 18, 2005.]

Choosing Loyalists

In choosing the candidates, Modi had taken into account a combination of
factors: loyalty, caste identity, and financial power.  

Individual character and record of work in the party were not the major
considerations. Among the 26 candidates for the parliament, two were not
members of the party on the day of selection.

Among the 26 candidates for the parliament, two were not members of the party
on the day of selection.

The Congress also had no other criteria for the selection of the candidates.
Moreover, intra-party faction fights dominated its selection process. Each
faction pressured the High Command to select their nominees.  This was more
so during the Assembly elections because each of the faction leaders aspired
to be the CM. Therefore, they recommended tickets for those who supported
their candidature.

Hindutva plank

In the Lok Sabha as well as the Vidhan Sabha and local government elections,
though the main focus of Modi’s campaign was development, his Hindutva plank
was also well entrenched.

In the 2002 elections, his anti-Muslim posture was blatant in his phases,
idioms, and illustrations. In the election campaign for the Ahmedabad
Municipal Corporation in 2005, Modi equated the sitting Congress mayor, a
Muslim woman to a Mughal period begum. He announced, “We have decided to free
the people of Karnavati [Ahmedabad] from the shackles of Mughal rule where
begum Sahebas and Badshahs are in control.” He asked the voters “to free the
people of Ahmedabad from Mughal rule.”

In his first campaign speech for the Vidhan Sabha polls, Modi said that the
design of the new two-rupee coin has been changed, replacing the map of India
with a cross, a veiled reference to Sonia Gandhi’s religious background. Modi
referred to the Central government as the Delhi Sultanate or Delhi durbar. He
frequently accused the Congress of playing vote bank politics by appeasing
minorities, particularly Muslims.  

BJP’s advertisements were: 
* [Congress] will sell country for votes?  Reservation on religious basis
  for votes ... Removed POTA [Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act] for
  votes, protect terrorists for votes, protecting mafias for vote ... BJP
  has disclosed this hypocrisy ... BJP will win.

Maut ka saudagar

During the Assembly elections, Modi countered aggressively when Sonia Gandhi
the Congress president accused him as a “maut ka sodagar” (Merchant of
Death). He criticized her for protecting terrorists. Terrorism and security
was another issue which Modi and Advani frequently raised during the Lok
Sabha poll. They asserted that Gujarat was the safest state in India with the
lowest crime rate, implying that is due to Modi’s rule. “Terrorist could not
target Gujarat.”

When the Supreme Court asked the Gujarat Special Investigative Team (SIT) to
investigate role of 68 officers and political leaders including Gujarat Chief
Minister Narendra Modi in the post Godhra carnage, he alleged “this is the
Congress’ conspiracy to send me behind bars.” On the day of polling, the BJP
advertisement was a “picture of a woman who is tying rakhi [holy thread] to
Modi. Below it was the sentence: ‘Our Narendrabhai in jail? Do you accept
this? Uproot the Congress today by voting BJP. Defeat all those who are
against Gujarat.’” BJP asserted that Manmohan Singh was a weak and
indecisive Prime Minister whereas Advani, the PM in waiting was strong. The
people were asked to vote BJP for the strong leader who could take firm
decisions.

[...]

The pre-poll survey of the NES in December 2007 shows that a majority (52
percent), though not an overwhelming number, believed that during the five
years of Modi’s rule “development of Gujarat has improved”. This is more so
in the condition of roads, water, and electricity.

Only one-third believed that the situation regarding irrigation had
improved. Employment, in their perception, was more or less the same or worse
than the past. It is important to note that as many as 67 percent of the
respondents, cutting across castes, classes, and also parties, felt that the
condition of the poor had either remained the same or deteriorated during
Modi’s regime.

Vote by Class in the 2007 and 2009 Elections
------------------------------------------------------------
Class    Congress (%)   BJP (%)     Others (%)   Total (N)
         -----------    ---------   ---------   ---------
          2009 2007     2009 2007   2009 2007    2009 2007
------------------------------------------------------------
Rich      32 30         58 59       10 11        117  335
Middle    38 38         53 52        9 10        337 1120
Lower     46 43         40 41       14 16        250  345
Poor      53 43         38 45        9 12        144  598
Very poor 56 40         42 43        2 16        108  255
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Lokniti Team, “National Election Study 2009: A Methodological Note,”
EPW, Vol. 44, No. 39, (September 26–October 2, 2009), pp. 196–202.
Note: *Computed combing family’s monthly income and assets.


The Congress, however, significantly improved its support from 43 percent to
53 percent, and from 40 percent to 56 percent of the poor and very poor
strata, respectively. The party’s projection that it stood for aam adami, and
Modi government’s failure in providing employment, education, and health care
to a majority of the population seems to have benefited the Congress among
the poor.

   
Vote % for Congress and BJP in Gujarat.  [Years increasing from R to Left]

[The article does not present number of seats won in 2007/ 2009.  Here are the
results: 
* Assembly elections 2007:
	BJP: 117 (from  127), Congress: 59 (51)
* Lok Sabha 2009: 
	BJP (NDA) : 15 (14)   Congr (UPA) : 12 (11) ]

Conclusion

The 2009 Lok Sabha elections in Gujarat was mainly Modi-centric.
He had mastery over publicity propaganda idioms and techniques to
project that he was the only savior of Gujarat. His message is that all
that the state has achieved is because of his commitments and unique
approach to good governance. In contrast, his predecessors, including
the earlier BJP governments, were responsible for all the shortfalls and
problems. His skill in selling dreams and slogans to mesmerize the
people is unparalleled in contemporary Indian politics. During his
rule in the last seven years, he has very skillfully dominated his party
and civil society, which articulates public opinion in general and of
the middle class in particular.

At present he and the mainstream civil society are in hand in glove.
The Congress also shares a neoliberal paradigm of development
that according to them is apolitical in nature and simply reflects the
“value free” principles uncovered by “positive economics.” In the last
elections, Modi scored over Congress in his majoritarian ideology and
projected “good governance.” His aura may now have begun to fade as
the downward trend in BJP’s share in votes in Gujarat suggests. This
may not be on ideological grounds. It may be because of the exposure
of his tall promises and his inability to resolve contradictions of his
governance. Pro-poor image of the Congress still works.

Gujarat BJP is becoming a regional party under Modi’s leadership.  The
regional identity and issues that he articulated during the last five years
had given the BJP an edge over the Congress in the last elections. Most of
the voters who were satisfied with the performance of the UPA government,
nevertheless voted for the BJP in the 2009 parliamentary elections because of
the perceived performance of the Modi government. At present, the Gujarat
Congress is not able to match Modi’s electoral strategies and planning. The
party is faction ridden, lacks alternative vision, and commitment to deliver
good governance in favor of the vast majority.

Contents

Preface 								xvii

PART I: Thematic Studies

1. Introduction: Political Stability and Governance Coherence 		3
	Paul Wallace
2. Regional Base and National Dream:
  Alliance Formation, 2009 National Elections 				21
	Ramashray Roy
3. Coalition Politics: Withering of National–Regional
  Ideological Positions? 						42
	Pramod Kumar
4. Region, Representation, and National Cohesion:
  Public Space in India 						64
		Jyotirindra Dasgupta
5. Federalism, Party System, and Structural Changes in India 		94
	Maneesha Roy
6. Gender Discourse in Elections: Constructing a Constituency? 	110
	Rainuka Dagar
7. The BSP in 2009: Still Making Progress, But Only
  as a Dalit Party 							140
	Christophe Jaffrelot

Part II: Analytical State Studies

8. Gujarat : Goebbel’s Propaganda and Governance: The 2009 Lok Sabha
  Elections in Gujarat 167
	Ghanshyam Shah
9. West Bengal
  Mapping a Political Challenge: West Bengal 2009 			192
	Amiya K. Chaudhuri
10. Rajasthan
  Silent Tsunami in Rajasthan: BJP Bastion Busted in 2009 		217
       Bhawani Singh and Vibhuti Singh Shekhawat
11. Kerala
  The LDF’s Debacle: Kerala Votes for National Stability 		234
	G. Gopa Kumar
12. Maharashtra
  Maharashtra: Still a Bipolar System, But Turmoil Ahead 		252
	Raghavendra Keshavarao Hebsur
13. Karnataka
  The Surge of Saffron: Some Genuine and Some Imitation? 		270
	Raghavendra Keshavarao Hebsur
14. Andhra Pradesh
  Political Mobilization, Competitive Populism, and
  Changing Party Dynamics in Andhra Pradesh 				286
	Karli Srinivasulu
15. Bihar
  Identity Politics Recycled: 2009 Lok Sabha Election in Bihar 		311
	Binoy Shanker Prasad
16. Jammu and Kashmir
  Ethnic–Religious Crisis and Electoral Democracy:
  Jammu and Kashmir Elections, 2008 and 2009 				335
	Praveen Krishna Swami
17. Northeast India
  Democracy, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Competitive
  Politics: The Case of States in Northeast India 			355
	Rajesh Dev