topics: |  philosophy | india |

A clearly written text, that compares Indian systems with western systems and terms.

This text, originally written in 1960, is intended both as a textbook and as a reference for scholars. What I like about it is the relatively easy flow, and the down-to-earth attitude.

The fact that it remains in print half a century later may be small reflection of its quality.

Having said that, I must observe that this is not a relation that holds with invariable concomitance or vyApti (व्याप्ति) - there are many excellent texts - especially those published in India - that have withered and gone, and this takes nothing away from their quality. [vyApti, according to diMnAga, requires that the negation of the consequence shd entail the negation of the premise. ]

panditry derived from this book aside, I would strongly recommend getting a copy. It does not shy away from naming the original sanskrit terms - which I feel is important, as you realize when you try to read any work on aristotle, say. These are technical terms, and they carry very fine shades of meaning which need to be referred to by their original names - if I would translate it as X and you as Y, it would not work at all.

Also I like the frequent quotation, in the footnotes, of longer sentences from the original texts.

But most importantly, Sharma is compact and readable.

Other similar books that I would strongly recommend are:

  * Bimal Matilal's Word and the World, 2001:
	more focused on the indian philosophy of language
  * Bimal Matilal's Character of Logic in India,
	2000. [more on epistemology and inference] 
  * Mysore Hiriyanna's Outlines of Indian Philosophy, a
  	 very readable work of synthesis. 
  * Dhirendra Mohan Datta, Six ways of knowing, [Out of print]
	Originally published by G. Allen & Unwin, 1932, you may be able to
	find a copy of the U. Calcutta edition, 1960. 
  * Mohanty, J.N., Classical Indian philosophy (2003) a modern
  	synthesis.  More vedantic, very light on the logic and language
	aspects (my main interests).


Radhakrishnan's two-volume Indian Philosophy I find rather dry.  

Excerpts

Why are there four vedas?

the name 'veda' (knowledge) stands for the mantras and the
brAhmaNas (mantra-brAhmaNayor veda-nAmadheyam).  Mantra means
a hymn addressed to some god or goddess. 

the collection of the mantras is called 'saMhita'. there are four samhitas
r^k, sAma, yajuH and atharva (ऋक, साम, यजुः, अथर्व). these are said to be
compiled for the smooth 
performance of the vedic sacrifices.

a vedic sacrifice needs four main priests:

   i) hotA होता, who addresses hymns in praise of the gods to invoke their
   	presence and participation in the sacrifice; [also होतृ (hotṛ)]
  ii) udgAtA उद्गाता, who sings the hymns in sweet musical tones to
   	entertain and please the gods; [also उद्गातृ (udgātṛ)]
 iii) adhvaryu अध्वर्यु, who performs the sacrifice according to the strict
   	ritualistic code and gives offerings to the gods; and
  iv) brahmA ब्रह्मा, ब्रह्मन्, who·is the general supervisor well-versed in
	all the vedas. 

the four saMhitAs are said to be compiled to fulfil the
needs of these four main priests r^k for the hotA, sAma for the udgAtA,
yajuH for the adhvaryu and atharva for the brahmA. sometimes
the vedas are referred to only as 'trayi,' omitting the atharva.

r^k means a verse, sAma means a song; yajuH means a prose passage. thus we
see that the saMhita-bhAga or the mantra-portion of the veda is the
hymnology addressed to the various gods and goddesses.

ch. 12 : nyAya

nyAya न्याय is a system of atomistic pluralism and logical realism.  it is
allied to the vaisheSika वैशेषिक system which is regarded as 'samAnatantra'
or similar philosophy (समानतन्त्र ).

nyAya and vaisheSika

vaisheSika develops metaphysics and ontology; nyAya develops logic and
epistemology. both agree in viewing the earthly life as full of suffering,
as bondage of the soul and in regarding liberation which is absolute
cessation of suffering as the supreme end of life.  both agree that bondage
is due to ignorance of reality and that liberation is due to right
knowledge of reality.  vaisheSika takes up the exposition of reality and
nyAya takes up the exposition of right knowledge of reality. nyAya mostly
accepts the vaisheSika metaphysics.

but there are some important points of difference between them which may be
noted. firstly, while the vaishheSika recognizes seven categories and
classifies all reals under them, the nyAya recognizes sixteen categories
and includes all the seven categories of the vaisheSika in one of them
called prameya प्रमेय or the knowable, the second in the sixteen. the
first category is pramANa प्रमाण or the valid means of knowledge.  

secondly, while the vaisheSika recognizes only two pramANas -
perception and inference - and reduces comparison and verbal authority to
inference, the nyAya recognizes all the four as separate - perception,
inference, comparison and verbal authority.  [some positions, e.g. the
chArvakas_ - deny even inference, since the inductive relation (vyApti)
cannot be established through valid reasoning.] 

in nyAyA, perception, inference, comparison or analogy, and verbal testimony
are the four kinds of valid knowledge.

first form of knowledge: perception.

gotama defines perception s: "non-erroneous cognition which is produced
	by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects, which is not
	associated with a name and which is well-defined' 193

nyAya recognizes the fundamental fact about knowledge which is said to be
the distinct contribution of Kant to western philosophy -- that knowledge
involves both sensation and conception. 'percepts without concepts are
blind and concepts without percepts are empty.'

IV. inference

the second kind of knowledge is anumA अनुमा or inferential or relational
and its means is called anumAna अनुमान or inference. it is defined as that
cognition which presupposes some other cognition.  it is mediate and
indirect and arises through a 'mark', the 'middle term' (li.nga लिङ्ग or hetu
हेतु) which is invariably connected with the 'major term' (sAdhya साध्य). it
is knowledge (mAna मान) which arises after (anu अनु) other knowledge. 197a

invariable concomitance, vyApti व्याप्ति (or avinAbhAvaniyama अविनाभावनियम)
is the nerve of inference. the presence of the middle term in the minor
term is called pakSadharmatA.  the invariable association of the middle
term with the major term is called vyApti. the knowledge of pakSadharmatA
पक्षधर्मता as qualified by vyApti is called parAmarsha परामर्श. and inference is
defined as knowledge arising through parAmarsha, [1] i.e., the
knowledge of the presence of the major in the minor through the middle; the
middle resides in the minor (pakSadharmatA) and is invariably associated
with the major (vyApti).

[1] parAmarshajanyam j~nAnam anumitiH. vyAptivishiSTapakSadharmatAj~nAnam
    parAmarsha
परामर्शजन्यम ज्ञानम अनुमितिः व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मताज्ञानम परामर्श

[abhinAbhAva - technical term introduced by di~NnAga दिङ्नाग
 - invariable concomitance
of A and B; A is not found without B and vice versa.  He provides a set
of three evidential criteria under which abhinAbhAva will hold. ]

the term नियतसाहचर्यनियम, niyatasAhacharyaniyama - is also used for vyApti.
(niyata = permanent; sAhacharya = companionship, togetherness; 
niyama = restriction, rule.)
]


--three terms of inference: 
like the aristotelian syllogism, the indian inference has three terms:

	minor term  : pakSa पक्ष
	middle term : li.nga लिंग (or hetu हेतु)
	major term  : sAdhya साध्य

Example:
	if we see smoke in a hill we conclude that there must be
	fire in that hill. 

	minor term pakSa  : hill 
	major term sAdhya : fire 
	middle term li.nga  : smoke 

	vyApti : smoke is invariably associated with fire 

from the presence of smoke in the hill as qualified by the knowledge that
wherever there is smoke there is fire, we proceed to infer the presence of
fire in the hill. 

integrated reasoning - both deduction and induction

this is inference. indian logic does not separate deduction
from induction. inference is a complex process involving both.

indian logic also rejects the verbalist view of logic. it studies thought as
such and not the forms of thought alone.  the formal and the material logic
are blended here. verbal form [is not an] integral part of the inference.
this becomes clear from the division of inference into svArtha (स्वार्थ,
for oneself) and parArtha (परार्थ, for others). in the former we do not
require the formal statement of the different members of inference.  it is a
psychological process.  the latter, the parArtha which is a syllogism, has to
be presented in language and this has to be done only to convince others.

five-member syllogism [avayavas]

there are five members in the nyAya syllogism: 

(1) pratij~nA or proposition (प्रतिज्ञा). It is the logical statement which
	is to be proved.
(2) hetu or 'reason' (हेतु) which states the reason for the
	establishment of the proposition. 
(3) udAharaNa उदाहरण which gives the universal concomitance together with
	an example.
(4) upanaya उपनय: the application of the universal concomitance to the
	present case.
(5) nigamana निगमन: conclusion drawn from·the preceding propositions. 

these five propositions of the indian syllogism are called 'members' or
avayavas (अवयव, limb). the following is a typical nyAya syllogism:

	(1) this hill has fire (pratij~nA).
	(2) because it has smoke (hetu).  
	(3) whatever has smoke has fire, e.g., an oven (udaharaNa).  
	(4) this hill has smoke which is invariably associated
		with fire (upanaya).  
	(5) therefore this hill has fire ( nigamana ).  

differences with Aristotle

[some of the differences are issues of form. For example, ]
though the nyAya syllogism has five and the aristotelian has three
propositions, the terms in both are only three -- the sAdhya or the
major, the pakSha or the minor and the li.nga or the middle.
[also, some propositions are redundant: the pratijn~A (what is to
be proved) is the same as the nigamana (what was established).  The fourth
avayava (upanaya) is also simply a concatenation of the vyApti in the
udAharaNa part with the pakSa (hill).]

[if we drop two out of the five propositions (4 and 5, say)] then 
we will find that this nyAya syllogism corresponds to the
barbara (AAA) mood of the first figure which is the strongest mood ·of the
strongest figure.  


the typical aristotelian syllogism may be stated in the nyAya form thus: 

	(1) socrates is mortal (pratijn~A).  
	(2) because he is a man (hetu).  
	(3) whoever is a man is a mortal, e.g., pythagoras (udAharaNa).  
	(4) socrates is a man who is invariably a mortal (upanaya).  
	(5) therefore socrates is mortal (nigamana). · 


but there are certain real differences between the nyAya and
the aristotelian syllogism...  the- aristotelian syllogism is only
deductive and formal, while. the Nesta syllogism is deductive-inductive and
formal-material. 

the nyAya rightly regards deduction and induction as inseparably related,
as two aspects of the same process - the truth now realized in western
logic. 
inference, according to nyAya, is neither from the universal to the
particular nor from the particular to the universal, but from the
particular to the particular through the universal.  ·

the udAharaNa (example) is a special feature of the nyAya syllogism and
illustrates the truth that the universal major premise is the result of a
real induction based on the law of causation and that induction and
deduction cannot be really separated. again, while in the aristotelian
syllogism the major and the minor terms stand apart in the premises though
they are connected by the middle term with each other, in the nyAya
syllogism all the three terms stand synthesized in the upanaya. 

again, while the aristotelian syllogism is verbalistic, the nyAya
recognizes the fact that verbal form is not the essence of inference and is
required only to convince others.

features of the middle term li~Nga लिङ्ग

there are five characteristics of the middle term: 

(1) it must be present in the minor term (pakSadharmatA); e.g., smoke must be
    present in the hill.

(2) it must be present in all positive instances in which the major term is
    present; e.g., smoke must be present in the kitchen where fire exists
    (sapakSasattva).

(3) it must be absent in all negative instances in which the major term is
    absent; e.g., smoke must be absent in the lake in which fire does not
    exist (vipakSAsattva).

(4) it must be non-incompatible with the minor term; e.g., it must not prove
    the coolness of fire (abAdhita).

(5) it must be qualified by the absence of counteracting reasons which lead
    to a contradictory conclusion; e.g., 'the fact of being caused' should
    not be used to prove the 'eternality' of sound (aviruddha).

inference is generally regarded as of two kinds - svArtha and parArtha which we
have already discussed. 

Causality vs Coexistence

gotama [गोतम, अक्षपाद गौतम] speaks of three kinds of inference - pUrvavat
पूर्ववत, sheSavat शेषवत, and sAmAnyatodr^STa सामान्यतोदृष्ट.

the first two are based on causation and the last one on mere coexistence.
a cause is the invariable and unconditional antecedent of an effect and an
effect is the invariable and unconditional consequent of a cause.

  - pUrvavat : inferr unseen effect from perceived cause - e.g. future rain
	from dark clouds in the sky.  [pUrva = previous]
  - sheSavat :  infer unperceived cause from a perceived effect - 
	e.g. infer past rain from the swift muddy flooded water of a river
  - sAmAnyatodr^STa सामान्यतोदृष्ट. inference is based not on causation but on
	uniformity of co-existence, e.g., when we infer cloven hoofs of an
	animal by its horns. 

[causality: कार्यकारणसम्बन्ध kAryakAraNasambandha.  

sAmAnyatodr^STa is concomitance without kArya or kAraNa relation.
	it may not be an invariable concomitance - e.g. the absence of
	pakSa may not indicate absence of sAdhya.  Thus, it can lead to a
	type of fallacy.

see J.N. Mohanty's Classical Indian Philosophy ch.5 for a concise
treatment of kAryakAraNasambandha.
]


according to another interpretation, a pUrvavat inference is based on
previous experience of universal concomitance between two things, a
sheSavat inference is parisheSa or inference by elimination, and a
samanyatodr^STa is inference by analogy.


link: Matthew R. Dasti, Nyaya, [Internet Encyc of Philosophy]
	http://www.iep.utm.edu/nyaya/

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